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The Many Faces of the Economic Substance’s Two-Prong Test: 
Time for Reconciliation?
Yoram Keinan*
The fall of 2004 saw the occurrence of several important developments in relation to 
the ongoing debate on the application of the economic substance doctrine.  It started 
with the issuance of the opinion in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States1 in the 
end of August, a case in which a District Court held that a transaction involving the 
contribution of stock with a built-in loss to a partnership lacked economic substance 
and had been entered into without any business purpose other than tax avoidance.  The 
court upheld penalties assessed by the IRS despite the taxpayer’s argument that it 
obtained and relied on two "should" level opinions supporting its position. 
During the fall, the Jobs Act of 2004 was finalized and finally signed by the president on 
October 22, 2004, leaving out the proposed codification of the economic substance 
doctrine.  Subsequent to the Government’s victory in Long Term Capital Holding v. 
United States,2 three District Courts have held for the taxpayers in cases involving an 
economic substance analysis.  First, in Black & Decker Corp. v. United States3a U.S. 
District Court has granted Black & Decker Corp.'s motion for summary judgment in its 
refund suit for over $ 57 million in federal taxes arising from a contingent liability 
transaction, on the grounds that the transaction had economic substance.  Second, in 
TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States4 a U.S. District Court (in the Second Circuit) has ordered 
the IRS to refund $ 62 million to TIFD, the tax matters partner of Castle Harbour-I LLC, 
applying the economic substance doctrine and finding that the LLC's creation was not a 
sham designed solely to avoid taxes)  Finally, in Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States5 a 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ordered the IRS to refund to Coltec Industries Inc. $ 
82.8 million in federal taxes arising from a contingent liability transaction, almost similar 
to the one in Black & Decker, on the grounds that the transaction satisfied the statutory 
language and requirements and, only as a backstop, applying the economic substance 
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doctrine to conclude that the transaction had both business purpose and economic 
substance.6
These events have emphasized the controversial application of the doctrine, and how 
divided are courts, the Government and taxpayers in their interpretation of the doctrine.  
In a previous article, this author has explored the profit potential issue, an ongoing 
debatable issue in relation to the doctrine.7 This article will focus on another unsettled 
issue, namely the application of the two- prong test. Frank Lyon v. United States8 has 
been construed to establish a two-prong standard for examining if a transaction lacks 
economic substance.  Under the general two-prong test described in greater detail herein, 
the economic substance doctrine is based on an objective and subjective determination of 
whether a transaction has real, nontax economic benefit.9  Nevertheless, since Frank 
Lyon v. United States, the United States Supreme Court has not issued an important 
decision involving economic substance analysis, and interpretations of the doctrine 
subsequent to Frank Lyon v. United States was left to the circuits.  As a result, circuits 
and courts are divided with respect to the application of the two-prong test, and several 
variations have emerged, each of which may result in a different way. 
This article will present the competing views regarding the application of the two prong 
test, and suggest a practical solution to reconcile these differences.   The conclusions 
advanced are that the two-prong test ought to be collapsed into a single objective test, 
which would generally consist of the current objective prong. 
I. History
The following is an overview of some of the landmark economic substance cases.  A 
more comprehensive discussion of these cases is set forth below.   
6
 See also Antantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, (equipment sale and leaseback transactions designed to 
practice tax benefits through membership in an LLC lack business purpose and economic substance and are 
disregarded for tax purposes);Nicole Rose Corp v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2003) aff'g 117 
T.C. 328 (2001) (court applied the two-part analysis to disallow ordinary business expense deductions 
relating to leaseback and trust fund interests held for less than one day); FSA 200218022 (citing Nicole 
Rose Corp. v. Commissioner, the Chief Counsel's Office applied section 482 to reallocate rental income, 
rental deductions, and loss deductions claimed in several stripping transactions and transfers of stripped 
leasehold interests).
7
 Yoram Keinan, The Profit Requirement Under the Economic Substance Doctrine, 21 J. Tax'n Inv. 81 
(2003).  
8 Frank Lyon Co.  v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
9 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) aff’g in part, ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999) ("In assessing the economic 
substance of a taxpayer's transactions, the courts have examined "whether the transaction has any practical 
economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses'...." quoting Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 
F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990)); Sochin v. Commissioner 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988) (articulating the 
objective analysis as whether "the transaction had ‘economic substance' beyond the generation of tax 
benefits"); Rice's Toyota World, Inc v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the 
economic substance inquiry is an objective inquiry into whether the transaction produced any nontax 
benefit).
As early as 1935, in Gregory v. Halvering,10 the Supreme Court established the 
requirement that tax motivated transactions must involve a business purpose to be given 
effect.  In this case, the taxpayer was the sole owner of a corporation.  The corporation 
owned securities with a built-in gain.  To convert ordinary income on the securities into 
capital gains, the taxpayer incorporated a new corporation and transferred the securities 
to the new corporation.  The old corporation distributed the stock of the new corporation, 
and immediately after, the new corporation was liquidated. Finally, the securities were 
sold.  The taxpayer argued that the gain from the sale was capital gains.  
The Second Circuit, and, subsequently, the Supreme Court, disagreed.  In the Supreme 
Court's own words:
Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, 
and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually, occurred, what do 
we find?  Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose - a 
mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise 
for concealing its real character, and sole object and accomplishment of which 
was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or 
any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the 
petitioner.  No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created.  But that 
corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It 
was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was 
intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that 
limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death.  In these 
circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are susceptible of but one 
interpretation.  The whole undertaking though conducted according to the 
terms of (the statutory provision), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of 
conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. 
The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not 
pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside the 
plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above 
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious 
purpose.11
In Higgins v. Smith,12 the Supreme Court further elaborated:
The Government urges that the principle underlying Gregory v. Helvering
finds expression in the rule calling for a realistic approach to tax situations. As 
so broad and unchallenged a principle furnishes only a general direction, it is 
of little value in the solution of tax problems. If, on the other hand, the 
Gregory case is viewed as a precedent for the disregard of a transfer of assets 
without a business purpose but solely to reduce tax liability, it gives support to 
10
 293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff’g 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). 
11 Id. at 469-470.
12 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1940). 
the natural conclusion that transactions, which do not vary control or change 
the flow of economic benefits, are to be dismissed from consideration. . .  The 
Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form 
employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal 
or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the 
purposes of the tax statute.13
In Moline Properties v. United States,14 the sole shareholder of a corporation, attempted 
to characterize gain from the sale of real property, title to which was held by the 
corporation, as gain to the shareholder on the grounds that the existence of the 
corporation was “merely fictitious” for federal income tax purposes.15  The Supreme 
Court held that the taxpayer could not disregard the corporate form of his business 
organization unless such form was a “sham or unreal,”16 setting forth a two-prong 
disjunctive test in determining whether a separate corporate entity should be recognized:  
(i) a subjective standard requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-tax 
business purpose that is served by the selection of the corporate form , and (ii) an 
objective standard requiring that the entity has engaged in sufficient business activity. 
In Knetsch v. United States,17 the taxpayer purchased 30-years deferred annuity bonds 
with a face amount of $4,000,000 bearing interest of 2.5 percent.  The purchase price was 
funded by a loan bearing interest of 3.5 percent.  The Supreme Court observed that: “it is 
patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction 
beyond a tax deduction.”18 The court ruled against the taxpayer on the grounds that the 
transaction had "no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer's desire to obtain a tax 
benefit."
In Goldstein v. Commissioner,19 the taxpayer borrowed $945,000 from two banks at 4 
percent interest, and investing the proceeds in U.S. Treasury securities maturing in 3 or 4 
years, with a face amount of $1,000,000, which paid interest of 1.5 percent. Similar to
Knetsch, the taxpayer in Goldstein had locked in an economic loss from the inception of 
the transaction.  The Court of Appeals rejected the Tax Court’s characterization of the 
transactions as a “sham” transaction on the grounds that the transactions were made with 
two different and independent banks, on a non-recourse basis.  The court concluded, 
therefore, that the transactions did, in fact, take place and therefore could not be ignored 
as "shams."  The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to
13
 See also Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) ("A sale by one person cannot be 
transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass 
title. To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to 
alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.").
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18 364 U.S. at 366.
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disallow the deductions on the grounds that the taxpayer’s purpose in entering into the 
transaction was solely to obtain tax benefits. The Circuit Court disallowed the interest 
deduction claimed under Section 163 citing a lack of economic substance as well as a 
lack of a non-tax business purpose as the reason for disallowance.  
Twelve years later, in Frank Lyon v. United States, the Supreme Court was faced with a 
sale-leaseback transaction.  In this case, the taxpayer borrowed $7.1 million, bought a 
building from a bank for $7.6 (the $7.1 million plus $0.5 million of the taxpayer’s own 
funds), and leased the building back to a bank for rent equal to the taxpayer’s payments 
of principal and interest on the 7.1 million loan.  The term of the lease was 25 years, with 
options to extend it up to 40 more years.  The lease agreement also provided the taxpayer 
with a fixed rate of return on its $ 0.5 million investment.  At the end of the lease term, 
the bank could either acquire the building or extend the lease.  The taxpayer claimed 
depreciation deductions from building and interest deductions on the loan, and reported 
the payments from the bank as income from rent.  
The IRS argued that the taxpayer acted as a conduit for mortgage payments and 
disallowed depreciation and interest deductions. The taxpayer argued that it was a 
separate entity and that the business purpose of the transaction was to overcome legal and 
regulatory constraints to which the bank was subject. 
The United States Supreme Court held for the taxpayer and held that the transaction was 
not a sham  The Supreme Court set forth the following standard to determine when a 
transaction should be respected for tax purposes:
Where . . . there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic 
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory 
realities, is imbued with tax independent considerations, and is not shaped 
solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the 
Government should honor the allocation. 20
Frank Lyon established the two-prong test pursuant to which the economic substance test 
comprised of two prongs: objective economic substance and subjective business purpose. 
This standard is discussed in greater detail below.  
In Rice’s Toyota World Inc. v. Commissioner,21 another case involving a lease 
transaction, the taxpayer purchased a 70 percent interest in a six-year old IBM computer 
for $1,455,227.  The taxpayer paid the purchase price to a financing company with a 
$250,000 recourse note, payable over three years, and two non-recourse notes, totaling 
$1,205, 227, payable over eight years. The taxpayer leased the computer back to the 
financing company for eight years, with rents calculated so that the pretax cash flows to 
the taxpayer were $10,000 per year.  In fact, the only amounts ever to change hands were 
20
 435 U.S. 561 (1978), rev’g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
21 Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).  
the $10,000 annual payments, representing the excess of the taxpayer’s income over its 
debt obligation.
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the two prong test established by the Supreme Court in
Frank Lyon as a disjunctive test.  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that a transaction 
will be treated as having no economic substance if "the taxpayer was motivated by no 
business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that 
the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit 
exists.“22
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner23 was the first CINS transaction reviewed by the Tax 
Court.  Generally, a partnership between a U.S. and foreign partner was formed to 
acquire non-readily-marketable property and sell it in exchange for a large fixed payment 
plus small contingent payments.  The resulting gain for the year of the sale was allocated 
to the foreign partner, while the later years' corresponding losses would be allocated to 
the U.S. partner.  The transaction was specifically designed to accelerate gain for the 
foreign partner and provide, through the partnership agreement, a distributive share of 
most of the losses to the domestic partners in later tax years.
The Tax Court held that the transaction lacked economic substance and described the 
economic substance doctrine as follows:
The tax law . . . requires that the intended transactions have economic 
substance separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax 
reduction. The doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a 
judicial remedy is warranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, 
unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that serve no economic 
purpose other than tax savings.24
Courts have observed, however, that the application of the economic substance and 
similar doctrines is limited.  In Northern Indiana Public Service Company v. 
Commissioner (“NIPSCO),25 similar to Aiken Industries, the taxpayer’s goal was to 
obtain exemption under the treaty between the United States and the Netherlands Antilles 
treaty.  The taxpayer created a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary for the purpose of 
obtaining funds. The subsidiary issued notes in the Eurobond market with a call option 
guaranteed by NIPSCO, and NIPSCO received the proceeds in exchange for a $70 
million note.  The subsidiary earned income on the spread between the interest it received 
from NIPSCO and the interest it paid to the holders of the notes. When NIPSCO paid off 
the note, the subsidiary redeemed the notes for a premium in addition to principal and 
interest paid to the holders of the notes. Subsequently, the subsidiary was liquidated.
22 Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 90 (4th Cir. 1985). 
23 Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 252 (3d Cir. 1998), aff’g in part, ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999).
24 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. at 2215.
25
 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997), aff’g 105 T.C. 341 (1995).
The IRS argued that the subsidiary was merely a conduit and should be disregarded The 
Tax Court rejected the IRS’s argument and distinguished from Aiken on the grounds in 
Aiken, the transaction had no business purpose, while in NIPSCO, the subsidiary had 
legitimate business purpose, that is, to borrow money in Europe at a favorable rate and to 
lend it to NIPSCO.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Tax Court’s decision, stating that:
Knetsch and the captive insurance company cases do not dictate the outcome the 
Commissioner desires. Those cases allow the Commissioner to disregard transactions 
which are designed to manipulate the Tax Code so as to create artificial tax 
deductions. They do not allow the Commissioner to disregard economic transactions, 
such as the transactions in this case, which result in actual, non-tax-related changes in 
economic position.26
Similarly, as the District Court indicted in Coltec Industries, “if a taxpayer clearly 
satisfies unambiguous statutory and/or regulatory requirements, courts may decline to 
apply the economic substance doctrine.” 27  For example, the district Court stated that the 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply the doctrine in Nebraska Department of Revenue 
v. Lowenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994), and stated that "whatever the language Frank Lyon 
v. United States] . . . may mean, our decision in that case . . . was founded on an 
examination . . . of 27 specific facts.").28
The IRS has also applied the doctrine in numerous rulings and other guidance. In 
Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 29 the IRS described the fundamentals of the economic substance
26 115 F.3d at 513. See also United Parcel Services of America v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 
2001), rev’g and rem’g, 78 TCM 262 (1999).
27
  Citing Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the Court in 
Coltec asserted that “[i]n light of the fact that the federal appellate court undertook no analysis of the 
"economic realities" attributed to Gregory and clearly limited its holding to the facts of the case, the court 
does not discern any directive requiring it to resolve the instant case under the economic substance 
doctrine.”  See also Executie Jet Aviation v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997), another decision 
cited by the court for the proposition that when the statute is clear enough, there is no place for common 
law doctrines stating that “where the language of the Code is clear, the ‘substance rather than form’ 
doctrine is irrelevant.  See also Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1970) ("Resort to 
'common law' doctrines of taxation . . . have no place where, as here, there is a statutory provision adequate 
to deal with the problem presented.").
28
 Citing also Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (emphasis added) (wherein the Court relied 
on "[o]ur reading of the statute . . . [which] is reinforced by the well established 'step-transaction' 
doctrine[.]") and Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 367 (1960) (emphasis added) (in determining 
"whether the transactions created a true obligation to pay interest[,] [u]nless that meaning plainly appears, 
we will not attribute it to Congress. . . . We, therefore, look to the statute . . . to its construction for evidence 
that Congress meant in section 264 (a)(2) to authorize the deduction of payments made under sham 
transactions entered into before 1954.").  
29
  2000-1 C.B. 744.
doctrine:
The courts have held that a loss is allowable as a deduction for federal income 
tax purposes only if it is bona fide and reflects actual economic consequences. 
An artificial loss lacking economic substance is not allowable.30
Since 2000, several legislative proposals have been made to codify or clarify the 
economic substance doctrine into the Internal Revenue Code.  As of today, none of these 
proposals have been enacted.  The most recent version has not been included in the Jobs 
Act of 2004, which was signed into law by the president in October 22, 2004.  These 
proposals are discussed in greater detail below
II. The Economic Substance Doctrine
A. General
Under the general application of the judicial economic substance doctrine, the tax 
benefits of transactions lacking such attributes may be denied.31 "An activity will not 
provide the basis for deductions if it lacks economic substance."32 A transaction that 
would otherwise result in beneficial tax treatment to a taxpayer will be disregarded if the 
transaction lacks economic substance.33 Nevertheless, as numerous courts have 
indicated, taxpayers are generally free to structure their affairs so as to minimize their tax 
30
 Citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 252 (3d Cir. 1998), aff’g in part, ACM 
Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999) ("Tax losses 
such as these ... which do not correspond to any actual economic losses, do not constitute the type of 'bona 
fide' losses that are deductible under the Internal Revenue Code and regulations."), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 
1017 (1017); Scully v. United States, 840 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1988) (to be deductible, a loss must be a 
"genuine economic loss"); Shoenberg v. commissioner, 77 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1935) (to be deductible, a 
loss must be "actual and real"), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 586 (1935).”
31 Killingsworth v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Since Gregory was decided, courts 
have consistently held that although a transaction may, on its face, satisfy applicable Internal Revenue 
Code criteria, it will nevertheless remain unrecognized for tax purposes if it is lacking in economic 
substance.”); Karr v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991) (“expenses incurred in 
connection with a sham transaction are not deductible.”); Treasury 1999 White Paper, at 56.(“the third, and 
final, way the IRS can use non-statutory standards to challenge the tax benefits of a particular tax-
advantaged transaction is through the application of the economic substance doctrine. This doctrine allows 
the IRS to deny tax benefits if the economic substance of a transaction is insignificant relative to the tax 
benefits obtained.”); Horn v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. App. D.C. 358 (“The economic sham doctrine 
generally works to prevent taxpayers from claiming the tax benefits of transactions, which, although they 
may be within the language of the Code, are not the type of transaction Congress intended to favor.”); 
Yosha v. Commissionerr, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988). ("There is a doctrine that a transaction utterly 
devoid of economic substance will not be allowed to confer [a tax] advantage.")
32 Ferguson v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
33 Killingsworth v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989) Boynton v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 
1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982); Swain v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066 (5th
Cir. 1981); Kuper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1976). 
liability; therefore, a transaction does not lack economic substance merely because it is 
tax motivated.34
A finding that a transaction lacks economic substance will result in disallowance of any 
tax benefits from the transaction. As the Tax Court specified in Glass v. Commissioner:
In conclusion, we hold that the London Option Transaction--petitioners' 
multiple and complex tax straddle scheme encompassing prearranged results--
lacked economic substance and was a sham.  Petitioners consequently may not 
deduct the losses claimed by them in Year One of their straddle transactions. It 
follows, of course, that since the straddle transactions were a sham, gains 
reported by petitioners in Year Two and thereafter do not constitute taxable 
income to them, and we so hold.35
In determining whether a certain benefit ought to be disallowed, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether the transaction that generated the claimed deductions. . had economic 
substance.” (emphasis added)36  Thus, a taxpayer may not combine a valid transaction 
with the disputed transaction to assert that the overall position had economic substance. 37
Frank Lyon has been construed to establish a two-prong standard for examining if a 
transaction lacks economic substance.  Under the general two-prong test described in 
greater detail below, the economic substance doctrine is based on an objective and 
34 Salina Partnership LP, FPL Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-352 (“It is well settled that 
taxpayers generally are free to structure their business transactions as they please, even if motivated by tax 
avoidance considerations.” citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) and Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. at 196, aff’d. in part, rev’d. in part, remanded, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985)). See 
also Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his 
taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the pattern which will best pay the Treasury”); 
Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277, 1281 (2d Cir. 1983) (“a transaction which is otherwise 
legitimate, is not unlawful merely because an individual seeks to minimize the tax consequences of his 
activities; Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 1977) (“We begin with the principle that 
a taxpayer, working within the law, may legitimately seek to avoid taxes.”); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A tax-avoidance motive is not inherently fatal to a 
transaction. A taxpayer has a legal right to conduct his business so as to decrease (or altogether avoid) the 
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes.”); Yosha v. Commissionerr, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 
1988) ("There is no rule against taking advantage of opportunities created by Congress or the Treasury 
Department for beating taxes."); Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925, 933 (1971), acq., 
1972-2 C.B. 1 ("The fact that the actions taken by the parties in this case were taken to minimize their tax 
burden may not by itself be utilized to deny a benefit to which the parties are otherwise entitled under the 
convention."); Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595, 600 (1968) ("[A] taxpayer may adopt any form he 
desires for the conduct of his business, and . . . the chosen form cannot be ignored merely because it results 
in a tax saving.")  
35
 87 T.C. 1087, 1177 (1986). 
36
 See Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, 2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004), citing 
Nicole Rose Corp. v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2002).  
37 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 256 n.48, cited by the Senate Report on the JOBS Act of 
2004
subjective determination of whether a transaction has real, nontax economic benefit.38
Courts have applied various tests to evaluate whether a transaction lacks such nontax 
economic benefits.  For example, several courts have compared the disputed transaction 
with transactions that might normally be expected to occur in bona fide business 
settings.39  Other courts have applied a cost v. potential profit to determine the existence 
or lack of substance.40  A minority of courts have applied the opportunity costs analysis 
pursuant to which a transaction is deemed to have no business purpose if the taxpayer 
could have earned the same benefit without the disputed complex structure.41
Generally, the taxpayer carries the burden of proof to show she has not been acting to 
avoid taxes.42  Courts have found a business purpose in several cases even though the 
taxpayer may have been primarily or predominantly motivated by tax benefits.  Under 
this approach, a transaction lacks a business purpose only if the taxpayer’s sole 
motivation is tax avoidance.43  As the Eleventh Circuit indicated in UPS, “no-business-
purpose cases concern tax-shelter transactions or investments by a business or investor 
38 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) aff’g in part, ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999) ("In assessing the economic 
substance of a taxpayer's transactions, the courts have examined "whether the transaction has any practical 
economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses'...." quoting Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 
F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990)); Sochin v. Commissioner 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988) (articulating the 
objective analysis as whether "the transaction had ‘economic substance' beyond the generation of tax 
benefits"); Rice's Toyota World, Inc v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the 
economic substance inquiry is an objective inquiry into whether the transaction produced any nontax 
benefit).
39
 Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879, 881 (5th cir. 1989), citing Est. of Baron v. Commissioner, 83 
T.C. 542, aff’d, 798 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986), Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, 344-46 (1980). aff'd, 671 
F. 2d 316 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. den’d 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
Thomas v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 1256, 1259 (4th Cir. 1986); Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 
704 (11th Cir. 1984). 
40
 See Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, 2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).
41
 See Long Term Capital Holding, 2004 WL 1924931 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004), citing Boca Investerings 
P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("defies common sense from an economic 
standpoint" to execute an investment indirectly through a partnership and not directly where indirect 
method diminishes profits by adding millions in transaction costs).  This standard was not accepted in the 
recent Jobs Act of 2004, as discussed below.  
42 Packard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397, 418 (“The precise degree of business motive or economic 
substance that must be present in a transaction for tax recognition is not clearly defined”, citing Rice’s 
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. at 202   See also Decon Corp. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 829 
(1976), note 3, citing Hoffman Motors v.United States, 473 F.2d 245, 257 (2d Cir. 1973); Starday 
Recording & Publishing v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 106, 108 (M.D. Tenn 1967); Davis v. 
Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1994-424 
(“Petitioners bear the burden of proving that the transactions at issue are not shams. Rule 142(a).”) 
43 Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984) Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 
792 (4th Cir. 1989) (“ this prong [business purpose] requires a showing that the only purpose for entering 
into the transaction was the tax consequences.”) Pacific Gamble Robinson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. 
915, 927 (1987);Ockels v. Commissioner, 54 TCM 785, 796 (1987); UPS Of America v. Commissioner, 254 
F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001)  (“A "business purpose" does not mean a reason for a transaction that is 
free of tax considerations. “) 
that would not have occurred, in any form, but for tax-avoidance reasons.” (Emphasize in 
original).44
B. The Two-Prong Test
1. Overview
Numerous courts have expressed the view that the inquiry into whether the taxpayer’s 
transaction has sufficient economic substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on 
two related factors, the “objective economic substance of the transaction” and the 
“subjective business motivation” behind it.45  The same principle was recently stated by 
the Senate report in the Jobs Act of 2004.  This standard will be referred to herein as the 
“two-prong” test.  The business purpose standard  focuses on the motives of the taxpayer 
for entering into the transaction, while the economic substance standard involves an 
objective analysis of the taxpayer’s economic position before and after the transaction.46
As set forth below, several variations have emerged for each prong. 
In addition, several courts have incorporated the substance-over-form doctrine as a 
third prong of the economic substance doctrine.  As the Ninth Circuit stated in Bail 
Bonds v. Commissioner:
The business purpose factor often involves an examination of the subjective 
factors which motivated a taxpayer to make the transaction at issue. The 
economic substance factor involves a broader examination of whether the 
substance of a transaction reflects its form, and whether from an objective 
standpoint the transaction was likely to produce economic benefits aside from 
a tax deduction.47
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,48 the Supreme Court held that a transaction will be 
recognized for tax purposes only if it has "economic substance which is compelled or 
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent 
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have meaningless 
44 UPS, at 1020, citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) aff’g in part, 
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999), Karr v. 
Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991), Kirchman and Rice's Toyota World, Inc v. 
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). 
45 See ACM Partnership, 157 F.3d at 247 (citing decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 113 T.C. at 280, 285 (also citing decisions by the Courts of 
Appeals for the Third, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits).  
46 See Sochin, 843 F.2d at 354 (“The application of the ‘business purpose’ prong is a subjective test, 
whereas the application of the ‘economic substance’ prong is an objective test.”).
47 Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987). See also 
Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The analysis of whether a transaction is 
a substantive sham, however, addresses whether a transaction's substance is that which its form 
represents.”)
48Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, at 583-84.  
labels attached . . ."49 Frank Lyon has been construed to create the two-prong test for 
determining whether a transaction is a "sham" to be disregarded for tax purposes entirely: 
"(1) has the taxpayer shown that it has a business purpose for engaging in the transaction 
other than tax avoidance? (2) has the taxpayer shown that the transaction had economic 
substance beyond the creation of tax benefits?"50
Frank Lyon has been interpreted differently in almost every circuit.  The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner51 has interpreted the two-
prong inquiry set forth in Frank Lyon as follows: a tax-favored transaction may be 
treated as an economic sham and tax benefits would be denied where (i) the taxpayer has 
no business purpose other than obtaining tax benefits and (ii) the transaction lacks 
economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a pre-tax profit exists.52
While in Rice’s Toyota53 the Fourth Circuit has treated economic substance and business 
purpose as two prongs of a disjunctive test, a position adopted by other circuits, as 
discussed below, other courts have applied a conjunctive test pursuant to which the 
taxpayer must satisfy both prongs to be eligible for the tax benefits.  Finally, several 
circuits have held that the objective and subjective prongs are related factors “both of 
which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from 
its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”54
2. Conjunctive/Disjunctive/Unitary
Circuits are divided on how to apply the two-prong test.55  Some circuits have required 
that a transaction will satisfy both the economic substance and business purpose (i.e., a 
conjunctive test) standards to validate a transaction.56 Other circuits have determined, 
49
 Id. See also United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d at 122, and cases cited; Peerless Industries, Inc. v. United 
States, 94-1 USTC ¶ 50,043 at 83,171 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d in an unpublished opinion, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Seykota v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2706, 2721 and 2726 (1991). 
50 See also Casebeer v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Rasmussen v. Commissioner, 
63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2710 (1992); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1548-
49 (9th Cir. 1987).
51
  752 F.2d at, 91-95.
52 See also Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-97, at 88-89 (“A transaction may be 
treated as a sham where (1) the taxpayer is motivated by no business purpose other than obtaining tax 
benefits, and (2) the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit 
exists.”) Citing Rice’s Toyota. Cf. Shriver v. Commissioner, (“we do not read Frank Lyon to say anything 
that mandates a two-part analysis. And although Rice's Toyota World seems to conclude a two-part test is 
consistent with Frank Lyon, the Fourth Circuit opinion does not appear to hold that such a test is essential.. 
. . We find no rigidity or inflexibility in either Frank Lyon or Rice's Toyota World.”)
53
 752 F.2d at 91.  
54 ACM Partnership, 157 F.3d at 247 (citing decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits); Winn Dixie, 113 T.C. at 42 (citing decisions in the Eleventh Circuit)
55
  See Senate Report on the JOBS Act of 2004, citing Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“The casebooks are glutted with [economic substance] tests. Many such tests proliferate 
because they give the comforting illusion of consistency and precision. They often obscure rather than 
clarify.”)
56
 See Senate Report, citing as an example Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993).  
See also Larsen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229, 1252, n13: (“The presence of business purpose does not 
however, that the existence of either economic substance or business purpose (i.e., 
disjunctive test) would validate a transaction.57  In addition, some courts have given more 
weight to one prong than the other and in several cases, focused primarily on one prong 
and disregarded the other.  For example, in applying the two-prong test, several courts 
have focused primarily on the objective prong in determining the validity of a transaction, 
and gave no, or minimal weight to the subjective prong.58 Other courts, however, have 
focused on the subjective intent of the taxpayer, frequently applying a profit motive test 
similar to that under section 183, as discussed herein.59
In addition, some courts have applied a more flexible test, generally referred to as the 
“unitary analysis” pursuant to which economic substance and business purpose are 
“simply more precise factors to consider” in determining whether a transaction has any 
practical economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits.60  Finally, courts are 
entitle a transaction to be recognized for Federal tax purposes where objective indicia of economic 
substance indicating a realistic potential for economic profit are not manifest.”)  See also Torres v. 
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702, 719 (1987) (“a finding of lack of economic substance is inappropriate if either 
a business purpose or a reasonable possibility of profit apart from expected tax benefits is found to have 
been present.”)
57
 See Senate Report for the JOBS Act of 2004, citing Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 
91-92 (4th Cir. 1985) (“To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated 
by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and, second, that the 
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists.”); IES Industries 
v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001) (“In determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax 
purposes [under the Eighth Circuit test], a transaction will be characterized as a sham if it is not motivated 
by any economic purpose out of tax considerations (the business purpose test), and if it is without economic 
substance because no real potential for profit exists” (the economic substance test).”). See also Sanderson 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1985-477 (“This Court has interpreted this language to mean that, to uphold 
the validity of a sale-leaseback transaction, the transaction must either satisfy a subjective "business 
purpose" test, or satisfy an objective ‘economic substance’ test.”).  As recently stated by a District Court 
residing in the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s standard, as stated in Rice’s Toyota, is the disjunctive 
test. See Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 at 6 (N.D. 
Md. Oct. 22, 2004).
58 Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“It is clear that transactions whose 
sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer.). 
Cf. Karr, 924 F.2d at 1023 (noting that subjective intent is not irrelevant, despite Kirchman's statement of 
the doctrine.). In, Rose, the Tax Court held that the proper test to determine economic substance is whether 
the transaction has any practicable effects other than the creation of income tax losses.  Accordingly, under 
this standard, a transaction that has a business purpose or profit objective will survive the Rose [the proper 
test is "whether the transaction has any practicable effects other than the creation of income tax losses."   
59 Smith v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 733 (1988).
60 See Senate Report for the JOBS Act of 2004, citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 
247 (3d Cir. 1998), aff’g in part & rev’g in part 73 TCM 2189 (1997) (“[The objective and subjective]
distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step 
analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction 
had sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”). James v. 
Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1990), aff’g 87 T.C. 905 (1986) and Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 
982, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply 
more precise factors to consider .... We have repeatedly and carefully noted that this formulation cannot be 
used as a ‘rigid two-step analysis’.”); Thompson v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).  See also Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, 2004 WL 1924931 (D. 
divided on what each prong means; although it is clear that one is objective and the other 
subjective, several variations have emerged for each prong.  Regardless of whether the 
rigid two-prong or the unitary test is applied, however, most courts agree that the 
objective economic substance and subjective business purposes are two different 
standards.61
In 1972, six years before Frank Lyon, the Ninth Circuit presented in Brooke v. United 
States,62 some of these competing views regarding the application of the two-prong test.  
The court first discussed the Government’s view of the test as a conjunctive test: 
The Government adamantly asserts that this transfer lacks a business purpose, 
which therefore disqualifies it for a business deduction. Several leading cases 
employ such language.63
The court went on and presented the view that only the objective test is relevant:
Other cases require only that the transfer be grounded in substantial economic 
reality.64
Finally, the court concluded that the conjunctive test ought to apply:
[A] transfer solely to avoid taxes will not be recognized.65
The Objective Prong
We first turn into the question what is the objective standard.  In general, there are 
several views regarding the application of the objective prong of the economic substance 
test.  As the Third Circuit recently summarized in CM Holding:
Conn. Aug. 27, 2004); Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) affg. 
Brown v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 968 (1985); see also Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 147-148 (2d 
Cir. 1991), affg. T.C. Memo. 1990-205; Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990), affg. 
in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1988-341
61 Cherin v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 986, 993 (“The economic substance of a business transaction and the 
intent, purpose, or motive of an individual investor, while sometimes equated, are not identical.”). Cf
Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1984) (“There is no real difference between the 
business purpose and the economic substance rules. Both simply state that the Commissioner may look 
beyond the form of an action to discover its substance.")
62 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972).
63 Citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 (1935); Van Zandt v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 341 F.2d 440, 443-444 (5th Cir. 1965); Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Transport Trading & Term. Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949).
64 Citing Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). Cf. Gilbert v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957). According to the court, Alden B. 
Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), expressly eschews the "business purpose" test. See also, Skemp v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956).
65 Citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 (1935); Audano v. United 
States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970).
There are several different formulations of the objective portion of the 
economic substance inquiry. Knetsch voided a transaction because it "did not 
appreciably affect [the taxpayer's] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax." 
364 U.S. at 366 (internal citations omitted). In United States v. Wexler we 
held that “where a transaction has no substance other than to create 
deductions, the transaction is disregarded for tax purposes." 31 F.3d 117, 122 
(3d Cir. 1994).  In ACM Partnership we required a "net economic effect on 
the taxpayer's economic position." 157 F.3d at 249. The main question these 
different formulations address is a simple one: absent the tax benefits, whether 
the transaction affected the taxpayer's financial position in any way.
Under the broadest view, courts focus on the taxpayer’s economic position before and 
after the disputed transaction and require that the taxpayer’s position be changed in order 
to satisfy the objective prong.  Under this approach, economic substance is determined by 
an objective evaluation of the changes in the taxpayer’s economic position, aside from 
tax benefits.66  As summarized by the Tax Court, “[e]conomic substance . . . is 
determined by objective evaluation of changes in economic position of the taxpayer 
(economic effects) aside from tax benefits.”67  The Senate Report of the JOBS Act of 
2004 stated differently:”[the economic substance] doctrine denies tax benefits arising 
from transactions that do not result in a meaningful change to the taxpayer’s economic 
position other than a purported reduction in federal income tax.”.68 In Long Term Capital 
Holding v. United States, the taxpayer argued that the objective test ought to be whether 
the transaction has changed the economic positions/rights of the parties other than tax 
savings.  The District Court, however, rejected this standard and applied the cost v. 
reasonably expected standard discussed below.  Finally, recent proposals to codify the 
economic substance doctrine supported this broader view.   Specifically, a transaction 
would be viewed as satisfying the objective prong of the economic substance doctrine if 
the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal tax effects) the 
taxpayer’s economic position.69
A narrower view would focus on the taxpayer’s expected benefits from the transaction.70
In other words, under this approach, not only the taxpayer’s position must change, it 
must be a change providing a benefit to the taxpayer.  For example, sometimes a 
66 Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 113 T.C. at 280, 285. Cf. Long Term Capital Holding v. United States 2004 WL 
1924931 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004), rejecting this test and applying the cost v. reasonably expected profit 
instead. 
67 Winn Dixie, 113 T.C. at 284.
68 Johnson v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 709 , 716-717 (1995).
69
 See proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(i)(I) and (II). 
70 Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987).
taxpayer derives a profit from the form of entity, from incorporation (limited liability), 
accounting benefits and other benefits not specifically translated into “profit.”71
Finally, the narrowest view would focus on the taxpayer’s reasonably-expected profits
from the transaction.72  In contrast to the previous views, this approach would require a 
quantification of benefits in the form of an economic profit.  Thus, this standard is 
narrower than the previous ones, because a meaningful change in the taxpayer’s 
economic positions will include potential profit, but may also include other elements that 
are not reflected in the profit potential test.   
In Long Term Capital Holding v United States73, the District Court applied a cost v. 
reasonably expected profit formula to conclude that the disputed transaction had no 
objective economic substance.74  The Federal Court of Claims expanded the definition 
and held that “[t]he determination of whether a transaction has economic substance is 
essentially a two part analysis: (1) whether the substance of the transaction is reflected in 
its form, and (2) whether the transaction had a reasonable objective possibility of 
providing a profit aside from tax benefits.”  The court emphasized that this standard 
requires that the taxpayer act as a “prudent investor” in determining whether to enter into 
the disputed transaction to satisfy the objective prong.  A similar view was earlier 
expressed by the Second Circuit in Gilman v. Commissioner,75 where the Second Circuit 
affirmed the Tax Court's economic substance analysis, which was approached from "the 
standpoint of a prudent investor."76
To conclude, the objective standard can either take the form of a narrow cost v. potential 
profit analysis, a broader potential benefit standard, or a, even broader test of evaluating 
changes in the taxpayer’s position before and after the transaction.  Satisfying the profit 
potential standard would, therefore, satisfy the objective prong.  
The Subjective Prong 
As set forth above, the inquiry into whether there was a legitimate business purpose for a 
transaction involves a subjective analysis of the taxpayer’s intent.77 To satisfy this prong, 
71
 For example, in TIFD, the taxpayer claimed other benefits, such as to raise capital and to demonstrate to 
investors, rating agencies, and its senior management, that it could raise capital.
72
 For a comprehensive discussion on what constitutes adequate profit potential, see Yoram Keinan, the 
Profit Motive under the Economic Substance Doctrine.  A discussion on the amount of profit required to 
satisfy this standard is beyond the scope of this article. 
73 2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).
74
 See also Cherin v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 986, 993 (“A business transaction by its very nature must have 
economic substance, that is, a realistic potential for profit.”) citing James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905 
(10th Cir. 1990), aff’g 87 T.C. 905 (1986). 
75 Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir, 1991). 
76
 See Long Term Capital Holding, citing Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d at 147.
77 Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. at 278, aff’d, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Lee v. 
Commissioner, 155 F.3d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1994); 
the taxpayer must demonstrate a nontax purpose to satisfy the subjective prong.  Some 
courts have held that the taxpayer's business purpose must be primary, i.e., of greater 
importance than tax benefits.78
Generally, subjective intent may be demonstrated by the existence of an objective pre-tax 
profit potential expected at the time the transactions were entered into and other business 
and regulatory considerations.79  Some courts even stated the subjective prong “is similar 
to the ‘primarily for profit’ standard of §§ 165 and 108.”80  Nevertheless, the fact that the 
principal (but not the only) purpose of a transaction is to obtain a favorable tax treatment 
is not a reason for disallowing such favorable treatment.81  For example, in UPS, the 
Seventh Circuit held that:
[a] ‘business purpose’ does not mean a reason for a transaction that is free of 
tax considerations. Rather, a transaction has a ‘business purpose,’ when we 
are talking about a going concern like UPS, as long as it figures in a bona fide, 
profit-seeking business.82
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit established in Boca Investerings and ASA Investerings that 
while taxpayers are allowed to structure their business transactions in such a way as to 
minimize their tax, these transactions must have a legitimate non-tax avoidance business 
purpose to be recognized as legitimate for tax purposes.83
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-115, aff’d. in part, rev’d. in part, dismissed in part, 
157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).  
78 Ramsay v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 793, 810 (1984); Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210, 232-33 (1983)
Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982), aff’d 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984). 
79 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d at 134-35. See also TIEF (“In evaluating the economic 
substance of a transaction, courts are cautioned to give more weight to objective facts than self- serving 
testimony.”) Citing. Lee v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1998); Shriver v. Commissioner, 899 
F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The business purpose inquiry examines whether the taxpayer was induced 
to commit capital for reasons only relating to tax considerations or whether a non-tax motive, or legitimate 
profit motive, was involved.”)
80 Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989).
81 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 (1978); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 
741 (2d Cir. 1966) (a tax benefit should be permitted whenever it can be said that the taxpayer’s desire to 
secure such benefit “is only one of mixed motives that prompts the taxpayer,” while a tax benefit should be 
denied where the transaction “has no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer’s desire to obtain the tax 
benefit”).  See also Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (“tax-
avoidance motive is not inherently fatal to a transaction. A taxpayer has a legal right to conduct his 
business so as to decrease (or altogether avoid) the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes.”), citing
Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988). ("There is no rule against taking advantage of 
opportunities created by Congress or the Treasury Department for beating taxes."); Aiken Industries, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925, 933 (1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 1. ("The fact that the actions taken by the 
parties in this case were taken to minimize their tax burden may not by itself be utilized to deny a benefit to 
which the parties are otherwise entitled under the convention."); Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595, 600 
(1968) ("[A] taxpayer may adopt any form he desires for the conduct of his business, and . . . the chosen 
form cannot be ignored merely because it results in a tax saving.").
82
 UPS, at 1019. 
83 Boca Investerings v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2003), citing ASA Investerings 201 F.3d 
at 513.
As noted in ASA Investerings: 
A tax system of rather high rates gives a multitude of clever individuals in the 
private sector powerful incentives to game the system.  Even the smartest 
drafters of legislation and regulation cannot be expected to anticipate every 
device. The business purpose doctrine reduces the incentive to engage in such 
essentially wasteful activity, and in addition helps achieve reasonable equity 
among taxpayers who are similarly situated--in every respect except for 
differing investments in tax avoidance.84
In Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, the court added another factor to the 
business purpose analysis - -the “reasonable means” factor.  The court observed that 
“[t]aking fee-generating investments was Long Term’s core business and was regularly 
executed without either complex machinations related to OTC’s contributions or the 
attendant millions in transaction costs.”85  Thus, a court can disregard a nontax business 
purpose if the taxpayer could have achieved the same result by entering into a more 
simple transaction, which is consistent with the taxpayer’s core business. 
In the Circuits in which the disjunctive standard is applied, even if the sole business 
purpose was to achieve tax benefits, the transaction may still be validated if it has 
economic substance.86 In some cases, the objective economic substance may be 
dispositive if the amount of economic substance is significant enough.87
As described in greater detail below, courts frequently focus on the profit motive of the 
taxpayer in applying the subjective test.  “The ‘business purpose’ test involves the 
consideration whether a taxpayer had an ‘actual and honest profit objective’ in engaging 
in the transactions at issue.”88 Thus, many taxpayers have attempted to prove that they 
entered into the disputed transaction to make a profit, in order to satisfy this prong.89  In 
other cases, such as TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,90 however, the court found that the 
transaction had a legitimate business purpose, accepting the taxpayer’s argument that it 




 Citing Boca Investerings P’ship, 314 F.3d at 631-32. 
86
 In Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 (N.D. Md. Oct. 
22, 2004), the parties stipulated that there was no business purpose, but the court still upheld the transaction 
on the grounds that it had economic substance. 
87 Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-359 (“[A] transaction imbued with economic 
substance normally will be recognized for tax purposes even in the absence of a nontax business purpose”); 
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (economic 
substance doctrine “do[es] not allow the Commissioner to disregard economic transactions . . . which result 
in actual, non-tax-related changes in economic position”).  
88 Coffey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-516. 
89
 See, for example, IES and Compaq, in which the taxpayer’s arguments focused on the profit potential 
from the transactions. 
demonstrate to investors, rating agencies, and its senior management, that it could raise 
capital.
3. The Conjunctive Test
Under the conjunctive standard, if a court finds the lack of either of the prongs, it, 
presumably, is not required to examine the other prong, and may invalidate the 
transaction.91  In other words, a taxpayer is required to establish the presence of both 
prongs for the transaction to withstand court scrutiny.
The conjunctive test has certain variations.  The basic principle is that a transaction must 
satisfy both standards, objective and subjective; nevertheless, some courts give more 
weight to one prong over the other, while others will treat them equally. While some 
courts begin with the subjective prong (usually by evaluating the profit motive) other 
courts have first tested the objective standard and if it were found that the transaction 
lacked economic substance, the court would stop and invalidate the transaction.92  As the 
Seventh Circuit indicated in UPS, “[e]ven if the transaction has economic effects, it must 
be disregarded if it has no business purpose and its motive is tax avoidance.”93
Under the conjunctive test, if the court begins with the objective prong and finds that the 
transaction had economic substance, it will next examine if the transaction had business 
purpose.94  On the other hand, if the court finds that the transaction lacked objective 
economic substance, it is not required to examine whether the taxpayer had business 
purpose.  In Ferguson v. Commissioner,95 the court held that:
Having concluded that the partnerships' Koppelman Process activities lacked 
economic substance, those activities must be disregarded for tax purposes and 
90
 No. 3:01cv1839 (SRU); No. 3:01cv1840 (SRU).
91 Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988) (the economic substance of a transaction can be 
established if the transaction had objective economic substance and there was a subjective non-tax business 
purpose.)
92 Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The analysis of whether a transaction 
is a substantive sham, however, addresses whether a transaction's substance is that which its form 
represents. That does not necessarily require an analysis of a taxpayer's subjective intent. Once a court 
determines a transaction is a sham, no further inquiry into intent is necessary.”) ;Lee v. Commissioner, 155 
F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1998), citing ,Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir 1990); Gilman 
v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148, n. 5 (2d Cir. 1991) (“section 183 applies after a transaction has been 
determined to have economic substance.”) cert. denied, 116 L.Ed. 2d 776, 112 S. Ct. 871 (1992); Mahoney 
v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 1219, 1220  (“Here, the Tax Court in a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion 
decided the transactions were a sham, thus making it unnecessary to directly reach the "entered for profit 
issue.")
93 UPS of America v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2001).
94 Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The threshold question is whether the 
transaction has economic substance. If the answer is yes, the question becomes whether the taxpayer was 
motivated by profit to participate in the transaction.")
95
 29 F.3d 98, 102 (1994),
cannot form the basis of any deductions.  It is unnecessary, therefore, for us to 
analyze the tax court's findings with respect to the partnerships' profit motive. 
Other courts applying the conjunctive test have begun with the subjective prong.  
Because the taxpayer must prove both prongs to prevail, showing an honest nontax 
business purpose would not suffice under this standard.  As the Tax Court indicated in 
Cherin:
Subjective intent cannot supply economic substance to a business transaction.  
Where, as in the case at bar, we examine the transaction and conclude as we 
do in this case that Southern Star's herd investment packages lack any realistic 
potential for profit, we need not examine the investor's state of mind.96
The Tax Court in Sheldon97 and ACM Partnership98 also started with the subjective 
standard, which was basically, a profit motive test.  In both of these cases, the Tax Court 
considered the profit potential to be probative of the taxpayer’s motivation.  Because the 
courts found the potential for profit to be insignificant, the Tax Court concluded that the 
taxpayer was motivated solely by tax benefits.  In general, if the court applies the 
conjunctive test, begins with the-profit potential standard, and finds it to be no more than 
de-minims, the court can stop and hold that the transaction should be invalidated and tax 
benefits be denied.  Nevertheless, in these two cases as well as in many others, the courts 
went on to perform the objective analysis.  
As set forth in greater detail below, all recent legislative proposals to codify the economic 
substance doctrine specifically would apply the conjunctive test.  Specifically, pursuant 
to the most recent proposal (which was not enacted into law), a transaction has economic 
substance only if (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal tax 
effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial nontax 
purpose for entering into such transaction and the transaction is a reasonable means of 
accomplishing such purpose.99
To conclude, as a practical matter, the conjunctive test works similarly to the unitary test 
described below.  Under both standards, a court would, generally, not validate a 
transaction unless the taxpayer satisfies both prongs in one way or the other. In addition, 
courts applying the conjunctive or unitary test give more weight to the objective analysis, 
and in some cases, as discussed in the next section, completely disregard the subjective 
prong. 
4. Applying Only the Objective Test
96 Cherin, at 99496 See Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) ("It is clear that 
transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the 
motive of the taxpayer.")
97
 Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990).
98
 73 T.C.M 2189 (1997), aff’d, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
99
 See proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(i)(I) and (II). 
In several cases, the economic substance objective prong has been the sole basis for the 
courts in disregarding the form of the transaction where the taxpayer's only claimed 
business purpose was to earn a profit.  Some courts completely disregarded the subjective 
standard and focused primarily on the objective standard.  The rationale behind this 
standard is that if the claimed business purpose of the taxpayer is to earn a profit by 
entering into the transaction, unlike the transaction in Frank Lyon which was also guided 
by accounting and regulatory concerns, the two prongs of the test overlap to a large 
extent.  
A similar view was expressed by both Treasury and the Joint Committee of Taxation in 
1999, in their lengthy reports on tax shelters.  Treasury suggested that
[a] tax avoidance transaction would be defined as any transaction in which the 
reasonably expected pre-tax profit (determined on a present value basis, after 
taking into account foreign taxes as expenses and transaction costs) of the 
transaction are insignificant relative to the reasonably expected net tax 
benefits (i.e., tax benefits in excess of the tax liability arising from the 
transaction, determined on a present value basis) of such transaction. In 
addition, a tax avoidance transaction would be defined to cover transactions 
involving the improper elimination or significant reduction of tax on 
economic income.100
This definition resembles the test applied by the IRS in Notice 98-5.101 In both Notice 98-
5 and the Treasury’s proposed definition, the subjective motives of the taxpayer are not 
taken into account.  Rather, the motives of the taxpayer are analyzed objectively based on 
whether the taxpayer reasonably expects an economic profit from the transaction in 
question. Thus, Treasury decided against adopting a subjective test and in favor of the 
objective leg of the economic substance doctrine. The rationale behind Treasury's 
proposal was that a subjective test would likely prove inadequate for the following 
reasons.  First, the Treasury argued that corporations exist to make a profit and therefore, 
will be presumed to satisfy the potential for profit test even if its expectation of profit is 
unreasonable.  Second, permitting corporate taxpayers to enter into transactions with 
unreasonable expectations of profit would permit corporations to engage in transactions 
solely for tax benefits.102
100
 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax shelters: Discussion Analysis, and 
Legislative Problems (1999)
101
 1998-3 I.R.B. 49
102
 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax shelters: Discussion Analysis, and 
Legislative Problems (1999)
According to the Joint Committee, a transaction will not be recognized for tax purposes if 
“[t]he reasonably expected pretax profit from the arrangement is insignificant relative to 
the reasonably expected tax benefits."103
As discussed above, subjective intent is frequently demonstrated by the existence of an 
objective pre-tax profit potential expected at the time the transactions were entered into 
and other business and regulatory considerations.  Thus, as a practical matter, the court 
applies objective analysis under both prongs. 
As the Second Circuit indicated in Rosenfeld v. Commissioner:104
[W]e decline appellant's invitation to adopt a business purpose standard of 
review. Rather, we believe our inquiry should focus on whether there has 
been a change in the economic interests of the relevant parties. If their legal 
rights and beneficial interests have changed, there is no basis for labeling a 
transaction a "sham" and ignoring it for tax purposes. Indeed, our prior 
decisions have indicated that this is the relevant inquiry.
In Carlson v. Commissioner, a case involving a purchase of a cable television system, the 
Tax Court elaborated and stated that: 
[W]e are not unaware of the proposition that where a taxpayer mistakenly 
believes there existed a potential for profit, a transaction devoid of economic 
substance may not be disregarded entirely (sometimes called the subjective 
business purpose test). See Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comr., 81 T.C. at 203 
n. 17.  Under the circumstances of this case, however, [the taxpayer] should 
have known that the transaction at issue could not achieve a non-tax profit. . . . 
We refuse to allow a sophisticated businessman who has not taken adequate 
steps to form a reasoned assessment of an investment to rely on his failure to 
take such steps and on his resulting ignorance. . . . To do so would encourage 
"tax shelter charlatans," and discourage taxpayers from independently 
evaluating transactions and making informed business judgments, thereby 
putting a premium on gullibility.105
This standard of review may be viewed as a part of the disjunctive test, because the 
existence of one prong, namely the objective prong, would validate a transaction.  Even 
though, technically, the disjunctive test discussed in the next section would allow a 
taxpayer to demonstrate either economic substance or business purpose, as a practical 
103
 Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of Present Law Penalty and Interest Provisions, as Required by 
Section 3801 of the Internal Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (JCS-3-99), Released on July 
22, 1999, at 229.
104 706 F.2d 1277, 1282 (2d Cir. 1983). 
105
 citing James v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 905 (1986). n.5 
matter, most taxpayers would focus on showing objective substance under the disjunctive 
test.106
5. Disjunctive Test
A standard applied by some Circuits (primarily by the D.C., Federal and Fourth Circuits, 
and occasionally by the Eighth Circuit) and several Tax Courts is a disjunctive test 
pursuant to which the economic substance doctrine will disallow a tax benefit only after a 
decision that the transaction lacked both a business purpose and economic substance (i.e., 
the existence of either a business purpose or economic substance would be sufficient to 
respect the transaction).107  The leading case cited for this proposition is Rice’s Toyota.108
Generally, in the Fourth Circuit, a transaction will be treated as a sham (or having no 
economic substance) if the court finds "that the taxpayer was motivated by no business 
purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the 
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit exists. 
.
109
As the Fourth Circuit elaborated:
The purpose of this test is to ascertain both the subjective motivations of the 
taxpayer and the objective reasonableness of the investment to determine 
whether the transaction contained economic substance aside from the tax 
benefits.110
Five years later, in Hines v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit followed this standard and 
held that:
106
 See, for example, Black & Decker, where the taxpayer and Government stipulated that there was no 
business purpose, because the taxpayer relied on the prevailing disjunctive test in the Fourth Circuit.  
107 Horn v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992). (the economic substance of a transaction can be 
established if the transaction at issue had objective economic substance or if there was a subjective non-tax 
business purpose.)
108
 See also Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 (N.D. Md. 
Oct. 22, 2004), holding that the Fourth Circuit applies the disjunctive standard.   The court relied on Hunt v. 
Commissioner, 938 F.2d 466, 471 (4th Cir. 1991) and Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir. 
1990) for its decision.  See also Friedman v. Comm'r, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989); Georgetowne 
Sound v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (D. Md. 1993), aff'd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4126 (4th 
Cir. 1994); Duke Energy Corp. v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 2d 837, 842 (W.D.N.C. 1999); Fisher v. 
United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11655, at *10 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
109 Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 90 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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 Id. 
Under the test in Rice's Toyota, however, a transaction with an expected loss 
may not be a sham if the taxpayer was motivated by some legitimate business 
reason other than to obtain tax benefits. 111
Citing Faulconer v. Commissioner,112 the Fourth Circuit implied that the subjective prong 
is tested on an objective basis, so there is some overlap between both prongs:
[T]he ultimate determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit is 
to be made . . . by reference to objective standards, taking into account all of 
the facts and circumstances of each case. A taxpayer's mere statement of 
intent is given less weight than objective facts. 
The Fourth Circuit, however, asserted that “[t]he mere assertion of such a belief, 
particularly in the face of strong objective evidence that the taxpayer would incur a loss, 
cannot by itself establish that the transaction was not a sham.” 113
Thus, the Fourth Circuit implied that a mere subjective belief that a transaction can 
generate nontax profit may not suffice.  This assertion may be viewed as inconsistent 
with the court’s decision in Black & Decker v. United States114 where it was stipulated 
from the beginning that there was no business purpose, but the court held for the taxpayer 
on the grounds that the transaction had objective economic substance. 
In Black & Decker v. United States,115 the District Court (in the Fourth Circuit) followed 
the Fourth Circuit’s disjunctive standard.  “The court may not ignore a transaction that 
has economic substance, even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.” 
Accordingly, the BDHMI transaction cannot be disregarded as a sham.” Thus, for 
purposes of its motion for summary judgment, Black & Decker conceded that tax evasion 
was its sole motivation, and focused on establishing objective economic substance. 
The District Court applied a combination of the Moline Properties doctrine (see below)
and objective economic substance analysis to conclude that a corporation and its 
transactions are objectively valid, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the 
corporation engages in bona fide economically-based business transactions.116
111 Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1990), citing Rice’s Toyota, 752 F.2d 96. 
112
 748 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1984).
113 Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1990), citing Rice’s Toyota, 752 F.2d 96. 




  Citing N. Indiana Public Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997); Moline 
Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 
561, 583-84 (1978). 
The Court looked at the facts and noted: 
that [the subsidiary] (1) "assumed the responsibility for the management, 
servicing, and administration of plaintiff's employee and retiree health 
plans;" [footnote omitted] (2) has considered and proposed numerous 
healthcare cost containment strategies since its inception in 1998, many of 
which have been implemented by B & D; [footnote omitted] and (3) has 
always maintained salaried employees. [footnote omitted]. Moreover, as a 
result of the BDHMI transaction, BDHMI became responsible for paying 
the healthcare claims of B & D employees, and such claims are paid with 
BDHMI assets. 
As a result, the court held that “[t]he BDHMI transaction, therefore, had very real 
economic implications for every beneficiary of B & D's employee benefits program, as 
well as for the parties to the transaction.” Applying the disjunctive test, therefore, the 
court held for the taxpayer.117
In general, the D.C. Circuit has also adopted the disjunctive standard.  In Horn v. 
Commissioner,118 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that to treat a transaction 
as a sham, the court must find that (i) the taxpayer was motivated by no business purpose 
other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and (ii) that the transaction 
has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit exists. The court 
cited United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co.,119 where the Court found that two types of 
reinsurance arrangements were not shams because they "served [other] valid and 
substantial nontax purposes," specifically, risk allocation.120 . . . a transaction will not be 
considered a sham if it is undertaken for profit or for other legitimate nontax business 
purposes.”121  Thus, the court held that establishing that the transaction was undertaken 
117 Cf. ASA P’ship, where the D.C. Court noted that satisfying the “business activity” test under Moline 
Properties is not enough – the transaction entered into by the entity must also have substance. (“Because 
ASA "engaged in more than sufficient business activity to be respected as a genuine entity," petitioner 
argues that ASA was a partnership under the second alternative. . .We agree if engaging in business activity 
were sufficient to validate a partnership ASA would qualify. It was infused with a substantial amount in 
capital ($ 1.1 billion), and invested it in PPNs, LIBOR notes, and other short-term notes over a period of 
two years. In fact, however, courts have understood the "business activity" reference in Moline to exclude 
activity whose sole purpose is tax avoidance. This reading treats "sham entity" cases the same way the law 
treats "sham transaction" cases, in which the existence of formal business activity is a given but the inquiry 
turns on the existence of a nontax business motive. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-66 
(1960).  Thus, what the petitioner alleges to be a two-pronged inquiry is in fact a unitary test--whether the 
"sham" be in the entity or the transaction--under which the absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal.”)
118
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119 United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 736-39 (1977). 
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  The court cited: Schneider & Englebrecht, "The Tax Court's Unified Approach to Analyzing Generic 
Tax Shelters," 6 J. Tax'n Investments 308, 309-10 (1989), and Moore, "The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An 
Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax Avoidance," 41 Fla. L. Rev. 659, 670 (1989).  Cf. 
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for profit (presumably under the objective prong) or any legitimate nontax business 
purpose (under the subjective prong) will validate the transaction.  
In Boca Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner122 the Federal District Court followed 
Horn, applied a disjunctive test and held that the test should a disjunctive test.  The court 
stated that "A transaction is not a sham and will be recognized for tax purposes if the 
taxpayer satisfies either part of the test for economic substance - if either (1) using a 
subjective analysis, the transaction has a non-tax business purpose, or (2) using an 
objective analysis, the transaction has a reasonable possibility of generating a profit, ex-
ante."123  Although this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, the repeal was not based on the standard applied by the District Court but rather 
on the grounds that in the view of the Court of Appeals, the disputed transaction had 
neither business purpose nor economic substance.124
In Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner,125 in evaluating the economic substance of the sale 
leaseback transactions, the Tax Court also followed Horn and concluded that: “the sale-
leaseback should not be respected for tax purposes because (1) no reasonable possibility 
for profit existed, and (2) RD Leasing was not motivated by any business purpose other 
than obtaining tax benefits.126  Note that the Tax Court applied a separate analysis with 
respect to the validity of the partnership, as discussed in greater detail below.  The Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed only the decision with respect to the validity of 
the partnership, and did not conduct a separate economic substance analysis with respect 
to the sale-leaseback transactions.127
In Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States,128 the U.S. Federal Court of Claims has also 
indicated that the economic substance test is disjunctive: 
In any event, the court already has considered and held that Coltec satisfied 
the tax avoidance and business purpose tests in Section 357(b), therefore, ipso 
122 Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003). rev'g 167 F. Supp 2d, 298 
(D.D.C. 2001).
123
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Economic Substance Doctrine, Derivatives Report Vol 3(5) (2001) at 9-10.
124 Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  See also Saba Investment v. 
Commissioner 273 F.3d 1135 (D. C. Cir. 2000), vac’g and rem’g T.C. Memo 1999-359 and ASA v. 
Commissioner, both decided in the D.C. Circuit, and in both, the court applied the disjunctive test but found 
neither economic substance nor business purpose. 
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transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purpose other 
than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance 
because no reasonable possibility of profit exists.' ") (quoting Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985).
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  331 F.3d 972 (D. C. Cir. 2003). 
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 No. 01-072T (United States Court of Federal Claims), reprinted in 2004 TNT 214-16.
facto, the ‘economic substance’ doctrine is satisfied, since that doctrine 
requires proof of at least one of these tests.129
Frequently, other circuits have applied the disjunctive test even though it may not be the 
prevailing standard in the circuit.  For example, in Shriver v. Commissioner, the Eighth 
Circuit followed Rice’s Toyota and applied the disjunctive test:
For the reasons set out above, we determine that the tax court found both a lack of 
business purpose and a lack of economic substance, thereby performing the 
necessary analysis to determine that the transaction was actually a sham under 
Rice's Toyota World.130
The Eighth Circuit, however, also asserted in Shriver that “we do not read Frank Lyon to 
say anything that mandates a two-part analysis. And although Rice's Toyota World seems 
to conclude a two-part test is consistent with Frank Lyon, the Fourth Circuit opinion does 
not appear to hold that such a test is essential.” 131
The court, therefore, applied in addition the unitary analysis discussed below. 
Subsequently, in IES, the Eighth Circuit did exactly the same. First, it stated the general 
rule that 
[i]n determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax purposes, the Eighth 
Circuit has applied a two-part test set forth in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985), which the Fourth Circuit 
ostensibly found in the Supreme Court's opinion in Frank Lyon Co. See Shriver v. 
Comm’r, 899 F.2d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1990). Applying that test, a transaction 
will be characterized as a sham if ‘it is not motivated by any economic purpose 
outside of tax considerations" (the business purpose test), and if it "is without 
economic substance because no real potential for profit exists’ (the economic 
substance test). 
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged, again, that it does not need to apply the 
disjunctive test:
[t]he Shriver Court analyzed the transaction at issue in that case under both 
parts of the test, but then said in dictum, "We do not read Frank Lyon to say 
anything that mandates a two-part analysis." Id. at 727.  The Court suggested 
that a failure to demonstrate either economic substance or business purpose --
both not required -- would result in the conclusion that the transaction in 
129
 See also Johnson v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 709 , 716-717 (1995), where the Court of Claims has 
followed the disjunctive test. 
130 Shriver v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1990).
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 Id. at 727
question was a sham for tax purposes. As in Shriver, we do not decide 
whether the Rice's Toyota World test requires a two-part analysis because we 
conclude that the ADR trades here had both economic substance and business 
purpose.132
Thus, it is unclear what standard is prevalent in the Eighth Circuit.  Similarly, it is unclear 
what standard is applied by the Second Circuit.  While the court in Long Term Capital 
Holding v. United States133 asserted that the Second Circuit applies the unitary test, the 
taxpayer in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,134 however, urged the court to apply the 
disjunctive test, and the court implied that the disjunctive test may also be applicable in 
the Second Circuit (although the court held that it does not matter for the particular case, 
because the taxpayer satisfied both prongs).  
A support for the taxpayer’s argument could be found in the Second circuit’s decision in 
Gilman v. Commissioner.135  In this case the Tax Court applied the Rice’s Toyota’s
disjunctive test, examined each prong separately, and concluded that the disputed 
transaction lacked a business purpose and economic substance.  On appeal, the taxpayer 
challenged the Tax Court’s use of the disjunctive test and argued that the “relevant 
standard for determining economic substance is "whether the transaction may cause any 
change in the economic positions of the parties (other than tax savings)," and "that the 
'profit motive/business purpose' inquiry should be based on the criteria in the regulations 
under section 183."
The Second Circuit supported the Rice’s Toyota’s disjunctive test, thereby rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument and held that: 
[T]he Tax Court did not demand that the taxpayer demonstrate both business 
purpose and economic substance. Rather, the Court examined each prong 
separately and concluded that Gilman lacked a business purpose and that the 
transaction lacked economic substance.136
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 See also Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner (“In Rice’s Toyota World, the court held that after 
Frank Lyon Co., it is appropriate for a court to engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether a 
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133 2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).
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DeMartino v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 400, 406 (2d Cir. 1988) (“A transaction is a sham if it is fictitious or 
if it has no business purpose or economic effect other than the creation of tax deductions.") 
Finally, the Third Circuit acknowledged in ACM Partnership (footnote 31) that even 
though it applies the unitary analysis: “it is also well established that where a transaction 
objectively affects the taxpayer's net economic position, legal relations, or non-tax 
business interests, it will not be disregarded merely because it was motivated by tax 
considerations.” Such assertions imply that the absence of business purpose.” 
The Third Circuit cited for this proposition in the footnote the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Northen Indiana Pub, Serv. Co. v. Commissioner137:
Gregory and its progeny ‘do not allow the Commissioner to disregard 
economic transactions . . . which result in actual, non-tax-related changes in 
economic position’ regardless of ‘tax-avoidance motive’ and refusing to 
disregard role of taxpayer's foreign subsidiary which performed a 
‘recognizable business activity’ of securing loans and processing payments for 
parent in foreign markets in exchange for legitimate profit.138
Several other Tax Courts followed the disjunctive test, generally quoting Rice’s Toyota
and Frank Lyon.   
In Packard v. Commissioner,139 the Tax Court cited these two cases and held that:
A taxpayer's failure to establish that a transaction was motivated by a business 
purpose rather than by tax avoidance is not conclusive, however, that the 
transaction was a sham. Rather, if an objective analysis of the transaction 
indicates that a reasonable possibility of profit existed apart from tax benefits, 
the transaction will not be classified as a sham. 
The Tax Court in Torres v. Commissioner,140 followed the same standard two years later 
in a sale and leaseback case and held that under the Rice’s Toyota standard:
[a] finding of lack of economic substance is inappropriate if either a business 
purpose or a reasonable possibility of profit apart from expected tax benefits is 
found to have been present. . . The record herein convincingly demonstrates 
that not only did petitioner have a reasonable possibility of realizing a profit 
137
 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir 1997)
138 ACM, at 247, footnote 31.  The District Court in Coltec Industries also cited Northen Indiana Pub, Serv. 
Co. v. Commissioner for the proposition that the economic substance standard is a disjunctive test.  Note, 
however, that Northen Indiana Pub, Serv. Co. v. Commissioner is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Yosha,861 F.2d 494  where the Seventh Circuit explicitly applied the conjunctive test (the 
economic substance of a transaction can be established if the transaction had objective economic substance
and there was a subjective non-tax business purpose.) 
139 85 T.C. 397, 417 (1985).
140
 88 T.C. 702, 718-19 (1987).
apart from tax benefits but also that petitioner was virtually assured of 
realizing such a profit.141
Because a taxpayer is only required to satisfy one prong, under the disjunctive standard, 
even if a court finds that the taxpayer had no, or insignificant, non-tax motivation, it 
would validate a transaction if it finds the transaction had objective economic substance. 
In Sanderson v. Commissioner,142 the Tax Court held that:
In the instant case, while we have little doubt that tax benefits were a 
significant aspect of this transaction, the record establishes the fact that the 
investment in the buildings provided a realistic opportunity for economic 
profit apart from tax benefits.”
Similarly, the Tax Court in Saba Partnership v. Commissioner143 relied on Horn v. 
Commissioner and asserted that “ a transaction imbued with economic substance 
normally will be recognized for tax purposes even in the absence of a nontax business 
purpose.”
Although in most cases applying the disjunctive test the taxpayer prevailed by showing 
objective economic substance, a taxpayer may still prevail on the grounds of having 
subjective business purpose, and not having to show objective economic substance.  
Citing Rice’s Toyota, the Tax Court indicated in Mukerji v. Commissioner: 144
Once business purpose is established, the transaction should not be classified a 
‘sham.’  A finding of no business purpose, however, is not conclusive evidence of 
a sham transaction. The transaction will still be valid if it possesses some 
modicum of economic substance. Conversely, transactions devoid of economic 
substance are not always shams such as where a taxpayer mistakenly believes 
there existed a potential for profit. But when there is a finding that the taxpayer 
entered into the transaction for tax reasons only, then it is proper to subject the 
141
 Id.,citing Packard v. Commissioner.  See also Friendship Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1054, 
1062-63 (1988) (“A two-pronged test has emerged. Under this test, we must disregard such transactions if 
we find "that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in 
entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable 
possibility of a profit exists.  Petitioner does not seriously contend that the transaction had a purpose apart 
from tax savings. Petitioner's witnesses all protested that tax considerations were not a major or primary
factor in petitioner's decision to invest in the equipment. They did not, however, identify any other 
motivating consideration that can be given credence. Thus we give greater weight to objective factors and 
conclude that petitioner's tax objective was the only real purpose of the transaction.”); Estate of Thomas, 84 
T.C. 412, 439 (1985) (a decision of the Tax Court subsequent to the Tax Court’s decision in Rice’s Toyota, 
where the Tax Court followed the disjunctive test, and concluded that the transaction had neither business 
purpose nor economic substance)
142 T.C. Memo 1985-477.
143 T.C. Memo 1999-359.
144 87 T.C. 926, 960 (1987).
transaction to an objective economic analysis to determine whether there could 
have been an opportunity for profit.145
6. Moline Properties146
In Moline Properties, the Supreme Court set forth the standards for recognizing a formal 
entity for federal income tax purposes.  The taxpayer in Moline Properties, the sole 
shareholder of a corporation, attempted to characterize gain from the sale of real 
property, title to which was held by the corporation, as gain to the sole shareholder 
individually on the grounds that the existence of the corporation was “merely fictitious” 
for federal income tax purposes.147  The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer could not 
disregard the corporate form of his business organization unless such form was a “sham 
or unreal.”148 Courts subsequently have consistently applied this standard in determining 
whether a given corporation qualifies as a separate entity.149
Moline Properties set forth a two-prong disjunctive test in determining whether a
separate corporate entity should be recognized, a standard that is equivalent to the 
economic substance standard. The first prong applies a subjective standard requiring the 
taxpayer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-tax business purpose that is served by the 
selection of the corporate form as a separate and independent vehicle for owning and 
conducting the activity in question. The second prong applies an objective standard 
requiring that the entity has engaged in sufficient business activity. If either prong is 
satisfied, the entity will be recognized as a separate entity.150  The amount of business 
activity necessary to satisfy the objective standard, however, may be minimal.151
In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner,152 the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the Tax Court’s reliance on the Moline Properties line of cases for “the principle that so 
long as a foreign subsidiary conducts substantive business activity--even minimal 
activity--the subsidiary will not be disregarded for federal tax purposes, notwithstanding 
the fact that the subsidiary was created with a view to reducing taxes.” The Seventh 
Circuit held that “[t]hese cases engender the principle that a corporation and the form of 
145
 Cf. Hines v. United States, where the Fourth Circuit held that: “[t]he mere assertion of such a belief, 
particularly in the face of strong objective evidence that the taxpayer would incur a loss, cannot by itself 
establish that the transaction was not a sham.”
146
 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
147
 319 U.S. at 439.
148 Id. at 438-39.
149 Bollinger v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 
1945); Nutt v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 231 (1962), rem’d on another issue, 351 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966), acq., 1964-2 C.B. 5; Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966), acq.,
1966-2 C.B. 7; Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (1968).
150 Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1256 (1975) (“Moline establishes a two-pronged test, 
the first part of which is business purpose, and the second, business activity. . . . Business purpose or 
business activity are alternative requirements.”).
151 Siegel v. commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (19XX). 
152
 115 F.3d 506, 513-14 (7th Cir 1997).
its transactions are recognizable for tax purposes, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so 
long as the corporation engages in bona fide economically-based business transactions.”
As set forth above, the District Court in Black & Decker v. United States153 cited both 
Moline Properties and Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (along with Frank Lyon and 
Hunt) for the proposition that the economic substance standard is disjunctive.  However, 
as set forth by the D.C. Circuit in ASA (see above), a taxpayer must prove not only that 
the entity was engaged in a business activity, but also that the entity’s transactions were 
not sham.154
To conclude, the disjunctive test is clearly more favorable to taxpayer than the 
conjunctive test.  Taxpayers, therefore, generally attempt to convince the court that it 
should apply the disjunctive test, while the Government, naturally, attempts to convince 
the court that either the conjunctive test or the unitary analysis is appropriate.155  As set 
forth above, in some circuits it is clear enough which standard prevails (Fourth, D.C. and 
Federal), while in others, it is up to the taxpayer to convince the court (Eighth, Second).  
As a general rule, even if a court applies the disjunctive test, it would settle for a one 
prong test only if such test would clearly allow the court to reach a conclusion.  Courts 
may begin with the subjective prong and if they have enough evidence to validate a 
transaction on the grounds that the taxpayer honestly expected an actual profit, there is no 
need to utilize an additional objective test.  The latter test would be necessary, however, 
when the taxpayer cannot prove by clear evidence its honest pursuit for profit.  In most 
cases, the court would have to apply the objective test.  If the court begins with the 
objective analysis, it may not need to examine subjective intention if it finds that the 
transaction had objective economic substance
7. The Unitary Analysis
153 Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 (N.D. Md. Oct. 22, 
2004).
154
“Because ASA "engaged in more than sufficient business activity to be respected as a genuine entity," 
petitioner argues that ASA was a partnership under the second alternative. . .We agree if engaging in 
business activity were sufficient to validate a partnership ASA would qualify. It was infused with a 
substantial amount in capital ($ 1.1 billion), and invested it in PPNs, LIBOR notes, and other short-term 
notes over a period of two years. In fact, however, courts have understood the "business activity" reference 
in Moline to exclude activity whose sole purpose is tax avoidance. This reading treats "sham entity" cases 
the same way the law treats "sham transaction" cases, in which the existence of formal business activity is a 
given but the inquiry turns on the existence of a nontax business motive.  See Knetsch v. United States, 364 
U.S. 361, 364-66, 5 L. Ed. 2d 128, 81 S. Ct. 132 (1960). Thus, what the petitioner alleges to be a two-
pronged inquiry is in fact a unitary test--whether the "sham" be in the entity or the transaction--under which 
the absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal.”
155
 See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004), for 
example. 
The origins of the unitary analysis are found in Zmuda v. Commissioner, 156where the 
ninth circuit indicated that there is no real distinction between the objective and 
subjective prongs, and that “[b]oth simply state that the Commissioner may look beyond 
the form of an action to discover its substance.”
Under this approach, “[a] taxpayer's subjective business purpose and the transaction's 
objective economic substance may be relevant to [the sham transaction] inquiry.”157
Thus, the two prongs are no more than other relevant factors in determining if the 
transaction ought to be respected for tax purposes.158  Nevertheless, courts that apply the 
unitary analysis often apply the two-prong test, either as a part of the unitary analysis159
or as an alternative test.160
As the Third Circuit indicated in ACM Partnership:
The inquiry into whether the taxpayer's transactions had sufficient economic 
substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on both the ‘objective economic 
substance of the transactions’ and the ‘subjective business motivation’ behind 
them. . . . However, these distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not
constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent 
related factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had 
sufficient substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax 
purposes.161
Similarly, in Sochin v. Commissioner, 162 the Ninth Circuit used almost the same words, 
holding that 
[w]e did not intend our decision in Bail Bonds to outline a rigid two-step analysis.  
Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply 
156
 731 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1984).
157 Rose, at 853, citing Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, 354, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). 
158 ACM Partnership, at 247 (“[The objective and subjective] distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry 
do not constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of 
which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from its tax 
consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”)
159 See Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that although tax court did 
not apply the "exact test" of Rice's Toyota World, there was nevertheless ample support for the court's 
finding of a sham transaction). See also Hines v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1990) ("While it is 
important to examine both the subjective motivations of the taxpayer and the objective reasonableness of 
the investment, in both instances our inquiry is directed to the same question: whether the transaction 
contained economic substance aside from tax consequences.").
160 Shriver v. Commissioner, (“Although we elect also to address the question of whether the two-part test 
applied in Rice's Toyota World is mandated by the Frank Lyon sham-transaction analysis, the following 
discussion only provides an alternative basis for our holding. . . Although we need not reach this issue, that 
is -- whether there is a requirement for a two-part analysis -- we do so to point out that such a requirement 
is far from settled law, notwithstanding [the taxpayer’s] protestations.)
161 ACM Partnership, at 247. 
162 Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). 
more precise factors to consider in the application of this court's traditional sham 
analysis; that is, whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other 
than the creation of income tax losses.163
The flexible, or unitary, test has been adopted by the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits as well as by several Tax Courts.164  As discussed herein, however, 
in some circuits, such as the Second and Eighth, it is not that clear that the unitary test is 
the prevailing doctrine.  Due to the flexible nature of the unitary standard, different 
versions of this flexible analysis have emerged.165 One notable version of this test, 
namely the “generic tax shelter” view, is discussed below. 
A court applying the unitary analysis would, generally, discuss both prongs, and would 
make a decision based on its findings as to these prongs; however, the decision will be 
made based on the transaction’s overall effect (in particular, does it have any practical 
163
 Citing Neely v. United States, 775 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1985); Thompson v. Commissioner, 631 
F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). 
164 Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1995); rev'g 64 T.C.M. 1003 (1992); Gilman v. 
Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 871(1992); Smith v. 
Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir. 1991); Bryant v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 
1991); Karr v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1991); cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 992 (1992);
Casebeer v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir 1990); James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 
908-9 (10th Cir. 1990); Shriver v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1990); Rose v. Commissioner, 
868 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1989); Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989); 
Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1988); Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, 354 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).  cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (“the consideration of business 
purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to consider in the application of this 
court's traditional sham analysis; that is, whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other 
than the creation of income tax losses.”); Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984)  
See also Provizer v. Commissioner, 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993); (stating Rice's Toyota World test but 
citing Rose as authority), aff'g per curiam 63 T.C.M. 2531, 2548 (1992); Rosenfeld v. Comr., 706 F.2d 
1277 (2d Cir. 1983). Jackson v. Comr., 966 F.2d 598, 601 (10th Cir. 1992); Gardner v. Comr., 954 F.2d 
836, 839 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'g Fox v. Comr., 56 T.C.M. 863(1988), cert. denied sub nom., Falk v. Comr., 
112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992); Lerman v. Comr., 939 F.2d 44, 55 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'g Fox v. Comr., 56 T.C.M. 
863, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 590 (1991); Shriver v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1990); 
Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) aff'g Glass v. Comr., 87 T.C. 
1087(1986); Forseth v. Comr., 845 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'g 85 T.C. 127 (1985)(fictitious sham); 
Mahoney v. Comr., 808 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'g Forseth v. Comr., 85 T.C. 127.
165 For example of the different types of standards applied by different courts, see Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 
1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax 
benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax 
losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) ("where transactions serve no 
'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax 
purposes"); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles 
disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating 
interest deductions); Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1984) (no real difference 
between the business purpose and the economic substance tests; both allow the Commissioner to look past 
a transaction's form to its substance.); Cherin v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 986 (1987) (the Tax Court 
disavowed the existence of a two-prong test and determined that the taxpayer's investment in the cattle 
breeding program lacked a realistic potential for profit and should be disregarded as a sham.)
effect other than tax effect), and not on the precise findings for each prong.166  The focus, 
therefore, is on the transaction’s effect on the taxpayer, other than a tax effect.  
The unitary analysis allows the court to be more flexible with respect to the weight given 
to each prong, and, in fact, it also allows the court to completely ignore one prong, if the 
court views it unnecessary to apply such prong.  As set forth above, in many cases, courts 
have presented the two alternative tests, the disjunctive and unitary, and concluded, 
generally, that under either test they would have reached the same conclusion (Shriver, 
IES, Compaq, TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States167).  In addition, in those circuits, the 
disjunctive test has been used at least one time, and, naturally, taxpayers have attempted 
to convince the court to apply this test, while the Government has attempted to persuade 
the court that the unitary test ought to apply. 
For example, in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States,168 the District Court (whose 
decision could be appealed to the Second Circuit), the taxpayer claimed that under the 
Second Circuit’s test, a transaction is valid if it has either economic substance or business 
purposes.169  The District Court, however, dismissed this argument,170 and thoroughly 
discussed the Second Circuit’s flexible view of the economic substance.171 As the court 
indicated, “[t]he nature of the economic substance analysis is flexible,. .  thereby giving 
rise to alternative formulations in the Second Circuit, including both subjective and 
objective inquiries.”172
In contrast, in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,173 the court was not as clear as the court 
in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States with respect to which doctrine is 
predominant in the Second Circuit.  The taxpayer asked the court to apply the disjunctive 
test, while the government asked it to apply the unitary test.  The court did a two prong 
analysis and held that the taxpayer had both business purpose and economic substance.  
Thus, the court said id did not have to decide which standard to apply.  
To conclude, under the unitary standard, instead of applying a rigid two-prong test 
(pursuant to which the court must find either lack of economic substance or lack of 
business purpose to invalidate the transaction), courts may simply apply a flexible sham 
166
 See also Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984) (“the unitary test is whether the 
transaction has any practical economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses.")
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 No. 3:01cv1839 (SRU); No. 3:01cv1840 (SRU).
168 2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).
169
  Id. at footnote 68.
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 Id., citing Ferguson, 29 F.3d at 102 ("Having concluded that the partnerships' . . . activities lacked 
economic substance, those activities must be disregarded for tax purposes and cannot form the basis of any 
deductions. It is unnecessary, therefore, for us to analyze the tax court's findings with respect to the 
partnerships' profit motive. See Gilman. . . .").
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 Long Term Capital Holding v. United States, 2004 WL 1924931,(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).  
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 Citing Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1991) and Lee v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 
584, 586 (2d Cir. 1998) (A transaction lacks economic substance if it "'can not with reason be said to have
purpose, substance, or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequences.'")
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 No. 3:01cv1839 (SRU); No. 3:01cv1840 (SRU).
transaction analysis to determine if the transaction has any benefit to the taxpayer other 
than the tax benefit.  Practically, however, there is little difference between the unitary 
and conjunctive standards, because a court applying the former test would examine both 
prongs to reach a conclusion.  
8. “Generic Tax Shelters”
A modified version of the unitary standard has emerged in the Tax Court, defined by 
several courts as a “generic tax shelter” standard.174  The Tax Court adopted the "generic 
tax shelter" test in Rose v. Commissioner.175  Under this test, transactions involving 
"generic tax shelters" are disregarded for tax purposes if the transactions are devoid of 
economic substance.176
The Tax Court in Rose v. Commissioner defined a "generic tax shelter" as a transaction 
possessing some or all of the following characteristics: 1) promotion by materials that 
focus on tax benefits; 2) acceptance of price terms by investors without negotiation; 3) 
assets consisting of packages of purported rights that are difficult to value in the abstract 
and overvalued in relation to the tangible property included as part of the package; 4) 
tangible assets that were acquired or created at a relatively small cost shortly before the 
transaction in question; and 5) the deferring of the bulk of consideration by promissory 
notes, nonrecourse in form or substance.177
Pursuant to the Tax Court, whether a transaction involving a "generic tax shelter" is 
devoid of economic substance under this test is to be determined by evaluating the 
following factors: 1) the investment activities of the taxpayers; 2) the relationship 
between the asset's price and fair market value; 3) the structure of the financing; and 4) 
the perceived congressional intent.178
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision but declined, however, to adopt the 
"generic tax shelter" test.  According to the Sixth Circuit: 
Whether characterized as a 'generic tax shelter' test or a two-prong 
subjective/objective analysis, the essential inquiry is whether the transaction 
had any practicable economic effect other than the creation of economic tax 
losses.179
174 Rose v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Whether characterized as a 'generic tax 
shelter' test or a two-prong subjective/objective analysis, the essential inquiry is whether the transaction had 
any practicable economic effect other than the creation of economic tax losses.").
175 Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987), aff’d 868 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1989) 
176 Hunt v. Commissioner, 938 F.2d 466, 471 (4th Cir. 1991).
177
 Id., citing Rose 88 T.C. 386 (1987) 
178
  Id., citing Rose at 415-422.
179 868 F.2d at 854.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that the "generic tax shelter" test is similar to the unitary 
analysis discussed above. 180  Thus, as the Fourth Circuit indicated in Hunt, there was no 
need to adopt another standard.181
III. Recent Economic-Substance Court Cases
A. Long Term Capital Holding v. United States182
A U.S. district court held that a transaction involving the contribution of stock with a 
built-in loss to a partnership lacked economic substance and had been entered into 
without any business purpose other than tax avoidance. Alternatively, the court held that 
the transaction could be recast under the step-transaction doctrine as a taxable transfer of 
the loss stock from the contributing partner to the general partner, followed by a sale of 
the stock by the general partner. Additionally, the court upheld penalties assessed by the 
IRS despite the taxpayer's argument that it had obtained and relied on two separate law 
firm "should" level opinions supporting its position.
1. Facts 
The essence of the transaction was to allow loss duplication through the contribution by 
Onslow Trading & Commercial LLC ("OTC") of stock with a built- in loss to a 
partnership, the sale of the contributor's partnership interest to the general partner, and the 
subsequent sale of the loss stock by the partnership.  The stock with the built-in loss (i.e., 
stock with low value but high tax basis) was created by contributing cash subject to a pre-
paid lease obligation to two different corporations in a section 351 transactions (“CHIPS” 
and “TRIPS”).  The key was that the lease obligations were not treated as a liabilities 
under section 357, so the basis in the preferred stock was amount of cash contributed, 
even though its value was  much lower (because it reflected the liabilities). The 
petitioners received a "should" level opinion from Shearman & Sterling supporting 
OTC's tax basis in the loss stock, and paid approximately $513,000 for the opinion.  
In April and November of 1996, OTC contributed cash and the loss stock to Long-Term 
Capital Partners LP ("LTCP"), a hedge fund, in exchange for a partnership interest in 
LTCP worth approximately $5M.. OTC borrowed the cash component of its contribution 
from Long-Term Capital Management UK, a UK entity related to Long-Term Capital 
Management LP ("LTCM"), the general partner of LTCP. 
180 Hunt v. Commissioner, 938 F.2d 466, 471 (4th Cir. 1991).
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 Id., at 471-72.  See also Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988) ("we need not 
adopt the generic tax shelter test. The casebooks are already glutted with tests. Many such tests proliferate 
because they give the comforting illusion of consistency and precision. They often obscure rather than 
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Sixth Circuit and others.”)  See also Rybak v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524 (1988).  
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In addition, OTC purchased from LTCM a "liquidity put" and a "downside put" with 
respect to its interest in LTCP. In general, these puts, each of which could only be 
exercised on or between October 27, 1997 and October 31, 1997, gave OTC the right to 
put its interest in LTCP to LTCM for an amount equal to the greater of (i) the value of 
such interest at the date of the put or (ii) OTC's original capital investment in LTCP. OTC 
exercised its liquidity put on October 28, 1997, selling its entire interest in LTCP to 
LTCM for $12,614,188, representing approximately a 22% return on OTC's investment.  
Of course, no section 754 election was made.
In December 1997, LTCP sold some of the preferred stock with a basis of $107M for 
approximately $1M, producing a loss of $106x, which was allocated to LTCM under 
section 704(c).  King & Spalding rendered a should opinion on the partnership aspects of 
the transaction.  The opinion was not delivered, however, until 1999.  LTCM paid a fee to 
K&S of approximately $500K.
Babcock & Brown, which designed the CHIPS and TRIPS transactions and (with help 
from Turlington) the partnership transaction and brought OTC and Long Term together, 
received a partnership interest in LTCP (held through UBS) and a 12-month consulting 
arrangement for unspecified services for which it was paid $1.2 million.
Turlington claimed he had earned a fee for his role in the transaction.  This claim was 
settled by Long Term paying Turlington $1.25 million and B&B paying $550K.
As manager of the underlying portfolio, LTCM earned fees for assets under management, 
proportional to the return achieved for the investors.  Long Term relied on the additional 
fees it would earn from both the OTC and the B&B investment to justify its ability to 
earn a pre-tax profit.  In addition, King & Spalding gave a "should" level opinion 
regarding the recognition and the allocation of LTCP's loss from its subsequent sale of 
the Loss Stock.  The IRS disallowed the loss otherwise allocable to LTCM and assessed 
penalties.
2. Economic Substance Analysis
The taxpayer argued that the standard in the Second Circuit is a disjunctive test.  Thus, 
the taxpayer asked that if the court finds either business purpose or economic substance, 
it ought to allow the tax benefits.  The court rejected this argument, and held that the 
prevailing standard in the Second circuit is the unitary test.  Nevertheless, even if the 
court would have accepted the disjunctive test, it does not matter, because the court held 
that the transaction lacked objective economic substance and also concluded that the 
taxpayer entered into the transaction without any business purpose other than tax
avoidance.  Alternatively, the court held that the transaction could be recast as a direct 
sale of the loss stock by OTC to LTCM under the step-transaction doctrine's "end result" 
test.
i. Objective Economic Substance
Relaying on the cost v. benefit analysis conducted by the Second Circuit in Goldstein v. 
Commissioner, the court held that LTCM had no realistic expectation of economic profit 
after taking into account fees.  The court reviewed the costs incurred by LTCM with 
respect to the transaction and held that the taxpayer could not have reasonably expected 
to generate a pre-tax profit after considering these costs and fees.  In particular, the costs 
included legal fees of $1M, the B&B fee of $1.2M, the Turlington settlement of $1.25M, 
and various internal allocations and bonuses paid to Long Term principals.  With respect 
to the potential profit, the court considered only the management fees LTCM could earn 
on the OTC investment, not the B&B/UBS investment, because the latter didn’t 
contribute to the obtaining of the tax benefits.  As a result, maximum reasonably expected 
gross earnings were estimated at $2M.
The taxpayer argued that the economic substance test ought to be whether there was a 
meaningful change in the taxpayer’s economic position.  The court, however, rejected the 
argument that a meaningful change in the parties’ economic positions is enough to give 
economic substance.  The court also rejected the taxpayer’s view that the counterparty’s 
business purpose imbues the transaction with business purpose. (Fn. 89)
ii. Subjective Business Purpose
The court found that the transaction was purely tax-motivated, notwithstanding the 
parties’ efforts to imbue it with a business purpose (earning fees).  Most notably, the 
court asserted that the transaction was brought to Long Term as a tax product.
The transaction was far more complex than necessary to accomplish the stated business 
purpose, which was to bring in a new investor so additional fees could be generated.  The 
court said, “[T]he construction of an elaborate, time consuming, inefficient and expensive 
transaction with OTC for the purported purpose of generating fees points to Long Term’s 
true motivation, tax avoidance.”  The court elaborated with respect to the business 
purpose subjective standard that Long Term did not carry out the transaction in a way 
that indicated it had any motive other than tax savings. The court implied that the 
transaction didn’t have a business purpose because its structure was too complex for a 
regular business transaction.  Thus, the court implicitly applied a “reasonable means” 
test, which, as set forth above, is inconsistent with the majority of courts across all 
circuits.183
3. Step Transactions Analysis
Alternatively, the court held that under the “end result” test of the step transaction 
doctrine, the court collapsed the several steps taken by the taxpayer  and held that OTC 
ought to be viewed as if it sold its preferred stock to LTCM, so LTCM had a cost basis in 
the stock.
4. Penalties
The court found the taxpayers liable for valuation overstatement and substantial 
understatement penalties.  The court held that the S&S and K&S opinions did not allow 
the taxpayers to qualify for the “reasonable cause/good faith” exception to the penalties 
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because: (i) the K&S written opinion was delivered late, and the record did not establish 
that Long Term had reasonably relied on K&S’s oral advice; (ii) there was no evidence 
that any of the Long Term partners other than Myron Scholes actually read the K&S 
opinion; (iii) the favorable authorities cited in the K&S opinion were based on facts 
materially different from those found by the court, so could not be relied upon; (iv) the 
K&S opinion did not adequately address Second Circuit precedent, nor the “end result” 
variation of the step-transaction doctrine; and (v) Long Term lacked good faith, as 
evidenced by the steps it took to conceal the preferred stock losses on its tax return. 
5. Conclusions
The court’s decision contains a thoughtful analysis of the law on economic substance and 
business purpose, with heavy emphasis on Second Circuit precedent, but essentially, the 
court offered no new doctrine.  The case essentially says that a transaction driven 
exclusively by tax benefits cannot be dressed up with a thin layer of economic substance 
and business purpose.  In this respect, it seems to differ little from ACM and similar 
cases.   Finally, footnote 89 distinguishes the pro-taxpayer decision of the 11th Circuit in 
UPS, which , as explained by the District Court, court involved the restructuring of the 
taxpayer’s business operation to derive a tax advantage, as opposed to Long Term Capital 
holding, which  involved a unique transaction having nothing to do with the taxpayer’s 
business.
The court’s primary reason for sustaining the penalties asserted by the IRS appeared to be 
that the transaction lacked economic substance and business purpose.  But the opinion 
also suggests that the opinion did not protect the taxpayer because it was deficient in its 
legal analysis and because at most one of the partners in LTCM had read the opinion.  
B. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States184
U.S. District Court (in the Fourth Circuit) in Maryland has granted Black & Decker 
Corp.'s (B & D) motion for summary judgment in its refund suit for over $ 57 million in 
federal taxes arising from a contingent liability transaction.
1. Facts
In 1998, B & D created Black & Decker Healthcare Management Inc. ("BDHMI") and 
transferred approximately $ 561 million to BDHMI along with $ 560 million in 
contingent employee healthcare claims in exchange for newly issued stock in BDHMI, in 
a section 351 transaction.  Subsequently, B & D sold its stock in BDHMI to a third-party 
for $ 1 million.
B & D argued that its basis in the BDHMI stock was $ 561 million (i.e., equal to the 
value of the property it had transferred to BDHMI.  Thus, B & D claimed approximately 
$ 560 million in capital loss on the stock sale, and used a portion of the capital loss to 
184 Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 (N.D. Md. Oct. 22, 
2004) reprinted in 2004 TNT 205-6.
offset capital gains it had from selling three businesses in 1998, and the remaining loss to 
offset gains in prior and future tax years.
Note that In Notice 2001-17,185 the IRS identified as listed transactions such transactions 
"involving a loss on the sale of stock acquired in a purported section 351 transfer of a 
high basis asset to a corporation and the corporation's assumption of a liability that the 
transferor has not yet taken into account for federal income tax purposes." The 
transaction in the present case occurred prior to the issuance of Notice 2001-17.  
2. The Parties’ Arguments
The United States argues that the BDHMI transaction was a tax avoidance vehicle that 
must be disregarded for tax purposes under the economic substance/sham transaction 
doctrine. B & D argues that because the BDHMI transaction had economic substance, it 
must be validated. Both parties stipulated that the transaction had no business purpose. 
3. Analysis
Generally, in the Fourth Circuit, a transaction will be treated as a sham (or having no 
economic substance) if the court finds "that the taxpayer was motivated by no business 
purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the 
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit 
exists.186 In other words, a court will not disallow the tax benefits if the taxpayer can 
show either subjective business purpose or an objective economic substance (i.e., a 
disjunctive test).  “The court may not ignore a transaction that has economic substance, 
even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.”187 Accordingly, the BDHMI 
transaction cannot be disregarded as a sham.” Thus, for purposes of its motion for 
summary judgment, B & D conceded that tax evasion was its sole motivation, and 
focused on establishing objective economic substance. 
The District Court applied a combination of the Moline Properties doctrine and objective 
economic substance analysis to conclude that a corporation and its transactions are 
objectively valid, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in 
bona fide economically-based business transactions.188
The Court looked at the facts and noted: 
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 2001-9 IRB 730.
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that BDHMI: (1) "assumed the responsibility for the management, 
servicing, and administration of plaintiff's employee and retiree health 
plans;" [footnote omitted] (2) has considered and proposed numerous 
healthcare cost containment strategies since its inception in 1998, many of 
which have been implemented by B & D; [footnote omitted] and (3) has 
always maintained salaried employees. [footnote omitted]. Moreover, as a 
result of the BDHMI transaction, BDHMI became responsible for paying 
the healthcare claims of B & D employees, and such claims are paid with 
BDHMI assets. 
As a result, the court held that “[t]he BDHMI transaction, therefore, had very real 
economic implications for every beneficiary of B & D's employee benefits program, as 
well as for the parties to the transaction.” Under the disjunctive test, therefore, the court 
held for the taxpayer. 
C. TIFD III Inc.  v. United States189
U.S. District Court (in the Second Circuit) in Connecticut has ordered the IRS to refund $ 
62 million to the tax matters partner of Castle Harbour-I LLC, finding that the LLC's 
creation was not a sham designed solely to avoid taxes.
1. Facts
TIFD III-E is a wholly owned subsidiary of the General Electric Capital Corporation 
("GECC"), a subsidiary of the General Electric Company ("GE"). GECC leased 
commercial aircraft. In 1992, at least partially in response to concerns about the number 
of airlines going into bankruptcy, GECC executives began looking for ways to reduce 
GECC's risk in the aircraft leasing business. 
Because of business limitations, selling the aircraft or borrowing money against them 
were not options. In May 1992, GECC submitted Requests for Proposal to seven 
investment banks. GECC accepted a proposal that required it to create a separate entity to 
which it would contribute a number of aircraft. Investors would then be solicited to 
purchase ownership shares in the new entity. The result would be that GECC would trade 
some of the risks and returns of those aircraft to the outside investors in exchange for a 
cash contribution to the newly created entity. The proposal also called for the investors to 
be foreign tax-neutral entities, an arrangement that would offer lucrative tax savings to 
GECC.
The proposal was implemented in two stages. First, three GECC subsidiaries formed an 
LLC (“Summer Street”) and transferred to it aircraft, nonrecourse debt, rents receivable, 
cash, and all the stock of a GECC subsidiary (“TIFD VI”) which had zero value. Second, 
189 No. 3:01cv1839 (SRU); No. 3:01cv1840 (SRU).
later that same year, the GECC subsidiaries sold $50 million of their interest in Summer 
Street to two Dutch banks (“Dutch Banks”). The Dutch Banks also contributed an 
additional $67.5 million, bringing their total investment to $117.5 million. Summer Street 
then changed its name to Castle Harbour-I Limited Liability Company ("Castle 
Harbour"), and TIFD VI changed its name to Castle Harbour Leasing, Inc. ("CHLI").
The partnership allocations were modified after the Dutch Banks were admitted. Under 
the operating agreement, each year the Dutch Banks were to have their capital accounts 
debited or credited, depending on whether the partnership had received a gain or suffered 
a loss, and each year the Dutch Banks were to have a significant portion of their 
ownership interest bought out by the partnership. The buyout payments were referred to 
as “Exhibit E” payments. At the end of eight years, if the Dutch Banks' capital accounts 
had actually earned a rate of return 9.03587%, the Dutch Banks' capital accounts, i.e., 
ownership interests, would be decreased to near zero. Similarly, if the Dutch Banks' 
capital accounts were credited with partnership income at a rate less than 9.03587%, the 
capital accounts would be negative after eight years; if the capital accounts were credited 
at a rate greater than 9.03587%, the capital accounts would be positive. Positive capital 
accounts would result in payments to the banks when the partnership wound up; negative 
accounts would mean the banks owed money to the partnership. If the banks' interests 
were not liquidated after eight years, the banks would still have their capital accounts 
credited or debited by allocations of income or loss in successive years.
Castle Harbour was required to maintain "Investment Accounts" for the Dutch Banks. 
No cash was paid into these accounts; they merely kept track of a hypothetical 
balance. The opening balance of these accounts was the initial investment made by 
the Dutch Banks, which was to be recalculated at the time the Dutch Banks exited the 
partnership as if every year the balance had been increased by a defined Applicable 
Rate but also reduced by the Exhibit E payments. If, when the Dutch Banks exited 
Castle Harbour, the Investment Account sum exceeded a specific allocation formula, 
that amount would be paid to the Dutch Banks, instead of the amount in their capital 
accounts.
The operating agreement defined two categories of income: Operating Income and 
Disposition Gains/Losses. Operating Income was comprised of income less expenses. 
Income was rent and interest on investments. Expenses consisted of normal 
administrative expenses, interest owed on aircraft debt, depreciation of the aircraft, and 
guaranteed payments to GECC entities. Once Operating Income had been calculated, it 
was allocated to the capital accounts as follows. If Operating Income was positive, i.e., an 
Operating Gain, it was allocated 98% to the Dutch Banks and 2% to the GECC entities. If 
Operating Income was negative, i.e., an Operating Loss, then it was (a) first allocated in 
an amount sufficient to offset the cumulative Disposition Gains allocated to any of the 
partners in previous years, (b) the remainder was then allocated 98% to the Dutch Banks 
until they had been allocated, cumulatively, $3,854,493 of Operating Losses, and (c) the 
remainder was allocated 99% to the GECC entities and 1% to the Dutch Banks.
A Disposition Gain or Loss was the result of the difference between the sale price of an 
asset, usually an aircraft, and its book value. Disposition Gains and Losses were allocated 
much like Operating Losses: (a) first, Disposition Gains were allocated to offset prior 
Disposition Losses and prior Operating Losses; Disposition Losses offset prior 
Disposition Gains, (b) the remainder was then allocated 90% to the Dutch Banks until 
they had been allocated, $2,854,493 of either Disposition Gains or Losses, (c) the 
remainder was allocated 99% to the GECC entities and 1% to the Dutch Banks.
2. Economic Substance Analysis
As the court indicated “a transaction will be deemed a ‘sham’ and disregarded when 
calculating taxes if it has no business purpose or economic effect other than the creation 
of tax benefits.190 There is no dispute that the Castle Harbour transaction created 
significant tax savings for GECC. The critical question, however, is whether the 
transaction had sufficient economic substance to justify recognizing it for tax 
purposes.”191
The court moved on to discuss the two-prong test: 
To determine whether a transaction has economic substance or is, instead, 
a ‘sham’ a court must examine both the subjective business purpose of the 
taxpayer for engaging in the transaction and the objective economic effect 
of the transaction.192
The taxpayer argued that the court must apply the disjunctive test pursuant to which if the 
court would find either a subjective business purpose or objective economic substance, 
the transaction is not a sham. The government, however, urged the court to apply a 
flexible two-prong standard that considers both factors but makes neither dispositive (i.e., 
the unitary analysis).
The court asserted that the decisions in the Second Circuit are inconsistent with respect to 
which test to apply. It also cited Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States193 as an 
example for applying the unitary analysis.  The court, however, did not have to decide 
which standard to apply, because, as the judge stated “under either reading I would 
conclude that the Castle Harbour transaction was not a ‘sham.’” The transaction had both 
a non-tax economic effect and a non-tax business motivation, satisfying both tests and 
requiring that it be given effect under any reading of the law.”
i. Economic Substance
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The Government argued that because the return earned by the Dutch banks was 
essentially guaranteed, it had no risk with respect to the transaction, and this means, 
according to the Government, that there was no economic effect.  The court dismissed 
this argument.  In return for a significant portion of Castle Harbour's Operating Income, 
stated the court, the Dutch Banks contributed approximately $117 million dollars, which 
was used by Castle Harbour's subsidiary CHLI either to purchase aircraft or to retire 
GECC debt. Although the Investment Accounts provided the Dutch Banks with some 
guarantee of return, lack of risk is not enough to make a transaction economically 
meaningless, stated the court. Even with an 8.5% guaranteed return, the Dutch Banks still 
participated in the economically real upside of the leasing business. Participating in 
upside potential, even with some guarantee against loss, determined the court, is 
economically substantial. Further, noted the court, the government's premise that a 
guarantee of a positive return indicates no risk, is simplistic. Whether an investment is 
"risky" to the investor depends on a number of factors, including the investor's cost of 
capital and opportunity costs. The court concluded that “[t]he economic reality of such a 
transaction is hard to dispute.”
ii. Business Purpose
“In evaluating the economic substance of a transaction, courts are cautioned to give 
more weight to objective facts than self- serving testimony.”194
The court found that the transaction had a legitimate business purpose; specifically, 
that GECC entered into the transaction to raise capital and, more importantly, to 
demonstrate to investors, rating agencies, and GECC senior management, that it 
could raise capital on its fleet of aging Stage II aircraft. In light of the economic 
reality of the Castle Harbour transaction, the court found persuasive the testimony of 
five GECC executives, who all swore that "demonstrating liquidity" and 
"monetizing" Stage II aircraft were important motivations.  The court found the 
testimony of GECC's executives persuasive. Consequently, it held that GECC was 
subjectively motivated to enter into the Castle Harbour transaction, at least in part, by 
a desire to raise capital and a desire to demonstrate its ability to do so. 
3. Economic Substance of the Partnership
Alternatively, the government argued that even if the transaction as a whole had 
economic substance, for tax purposes the Dutch banks were not partners of the 
GECC entities but rather were their creditors.  The court identified two 
circumstances under which the Dutch banks would not be considered partners: (1) 
if there was no economic reality to the label "partner;" and (2) if, regardless of the 
economics of the situation, the Code would simply classify them as something 
else.  The court applied a separate economic substance analysis to the first 
circumstance, but, rather than examining the substance of the entire transaction, it 
focused on “whether there was any economic reality to the choice of the 
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partnership form.” As to the second circumstance, the court held that there is no 
current authority for it to re-classify an interest in a partnership as something else. 
First, the court emphasized that:
I concluded that the transaction that created Castle Harbour was not a 
sham. In other words, I concluded there was valid business purpose and 
economic reality in the arrangement by which the GECC entities and the 
Dutch Banks came together to form Castle Harbour, i.e., there was 
economic substance in not only the actions, but also the formation, of the 
partnership.
The decision to form a partnership, noted the court, may be economically 
insubstantial, even though the partnership undertakes a legitimate business. Here, 
the court found that there was economic substance in not only the actions, but also 
the formation, of the partnership. The court distinguished this case from the 
situations in ASA Investerings P’ship v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir 
2000) [add link], mainly on the grounds that in ASA, the foreign partners were 
entirely indifferent to the partnership’s activities (because their return was 100% 
guaranteed), as opposed to the present case where the Dutch Banks could have 
suffered some downside (albeit limited) and could have earned more profit than 
the guaranteed return.  In the present case, the Dutch Banks had a very real stake 
in the transaction because their return was tied directly to the performance of the 
aircraft leasing business. 
D. Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States195
A U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ordered the IRS to refund to Coltec Industries Inc. $ 
82.8 million in federal taxes arising from a contingent liability transaction.  The first 
paragraph of the decisions provided a clear indication of what the decision is going to be.  
The court cited Atlantic Coast Line v. Phillips196 quoting from prior decisions of Justice 
Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, observed:
As to the astuteness of taxpayers in ordering their affairs so as to minimize 
taxes we have said that 'the very meaning of a line in the law is that you 
intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.' This is 
so because [there is no] 'public duty to pay more than the law demands: 
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.'197
1. Facts 
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Coltec Industries, Inc. ("Coltec") a publicly-traded holding company owns Garlock, Inc. 
("Garlock").  Garlock's companies include, Garlock Mechanical Packing Company, 
Stemco, Inc. and Anchor Packing ("Anchor"). The latter is a manufacturer and distributor 
of industrial gaskets, pump packings, valves, and mechanical seals.  Anchor utilized 
asbestos in manufacturing these products.  In 1993, Coltec decided to discontinue 
Anchor's business operations and by 1996, Anchor's only assets were nearly depleted 
insurance coverage and a small building in Louisiana.  By the early 1990's, Anchor and 
Garlock were or had been defendants in approximately 100,000 asbestos cases.
In 1996, Coltec established “Garrison,” a "case management subsidiary," to handle the 
asbestos cases.  Garrison authorized the issuance of 300,000 shares of common stock and 
1,500,000 shares of Class A stock.  Coltec contributed $ 998,000 to Garrison in exchange 
for 99,800 shares of Garrison common stock and $ 13,000,000 in exchange for 1,300,000 
shares of Garrison Class A stock.  
To effect capitalization of Garrison, Garlock caused Stemco to issue a promissory note to 
Garlock in the amount of $ 375 million.  Garlock contributed to Garrison the Stemco 
Note, the outstanding stock of Anchor, the rights to any future asbestos insurance 
recoveries, furniture, fixtures, and equipment, and all of the files, records, and data of the 
Asbestos Litigation Department.  In exchange, Garrison issued 100,000 shares of 
Garrison common stock to Garlock and assumed defense and payment of Garlock's and 
Anchor's contingent asbestos liabilities.
On December 1996, several banks' subsidiaries purchased 50,000 shares of Garrison 
common stock for $ 250,000 or 100,000 shares for a total of $ 500,000 or $ 5 per share.  
In return, Coltec agreed to indemnify the Banks for any asbestos related claims that may 
arise in the future.  An exit strategy was set forth in a separate agreement wherein the 
banks were granted the right to "put" the Garrison shares to Coltec at fair market value, 
and Coltec had the right to "call" or buy back the shares at a fixed price; each option right 
was executable after five years.  The Banks have not exercised their put rights and Coltec 
has not exercised its call options. 
2. Analysis
The court examined the transaction using a three step analysis.  First, it examined 
whether the contribution of the Anchor stock and Stemco promissory note to Garrison 
was qualified property under section 351 and therefore, non-recognition of gain or loss on 
the exchange was justified.  Second, the court reviewed whether the Garloc’s basis in the 
Garison’s stock ought to be reduced because of Garrison's assumption of the 
shareholder’s contingent asbestos liabilities.  This step required an examination whether 
the contingent liabilities constitute "liabilities" under either section 257 or 358(d).  
Finally, the court explored the question whether the sale of Garrison stock to the banks, 
which generated the loss, should be respected. 
In addition, the court applied the business purpose test contained in section 357(b) as well 
as, separately, the common law economic substance test to the transaction, and under 
both standards, held that the transaction was not motivated solely by tax motivations. 
i. Section 351
The court held that the contribution of the stock and the promissory notes to Garrison 
satisfied section 351 because (i) Coltec and Garlock transferred qualifying "property" 
(i.e., the stock and notes) to Garrison; (ii) Coltec and Garlock received only stock from 
Garrison (Coltec received 93% of the equity of Garrison and Garlock received 7% of the 
equity of Garrison); and (iii) immediately after the exchange, Coltec and Garlock owned 
and controlled 100% of the total combined voting power of all classes of Garrison stock 
entitled to vote.  Thus, the requirements of section 351 were met in this case. 
ii. Garlock’s Basis in the Stock
Pursuant to section 358(d)(1), in a stock exchange to which section 351 applies, the 
assumption of liabilities by another party to the stock exchange is treated as money 
received by the distribute upon the exchange, and, therefore, the distributee’s basis in the 
stock received ought to be reduced to the extent of the amount of the liabilities assumed.  
Treas. Reg. 1.461-1(a)(2)(j) provides that, for an accrual method taxpayer, a liability "is 
incurred, and generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes, in the 
taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability 
[and] the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy." 
In the present case, the court held that the asbestos liabilities assumed by Garrison 
were contingent, since both of the events necessary to establish the fact of the 
liability had not occurred, i.e., the filing of a lawsuit asserting a claim and an 
adjudication of liability. Thus, because section 358(h) was enacted only in 1999 
and did not apply to the transaction, the court held that Garlock will reduce its 
basis in the Garrison stock if and when the liabilities accrue and are satisfied by 
Garrison. 
iii. Sale of the Stock
The court restated the principle that a sale occurs if the benefits and burdens of ownership 
have passed from the seller to the buyer.  The Government attempted to show that the 
purchasers of the Garrison stock did not obtain the burdens and benefits of ownership on 
the stock.  The court, however, rejected the Government’s arguments on the following 
grounds: (i) the stock entitled the banks to a proportionate distribution upon liquidation, 
similarly to the stock , but were only required to provide Coltec with notice On such a 
sale; (iii) regarding the control issue, the Banks acquired a minority position in Garrison, 
and their rights were typical to any minority interest in a company (i.e., they could not 
expected to control the company); (iv) the banks had stakes in Garrison through the life 
of the venture; and (v) the banks were concerned about veil piercing and they too formed 
separate corporations to insulate their main business and required further indemnification 
from Coltec.  Finally, tThe court also concluded that the transaction was made in arm’s 
length. 
3. Section 357(b) – Tax Avoidance (or Business Purpose) Test
The court tested to see if Garrison's assumption of the Garlock liabilities was not 
undertaken for "the principal purpose . . . to avoid federal income tax[.]" under section 
357(b).  In addition, the court required that Coltec demonstrate that assumption of such 
liabilities also had a "bona fide business purpose." Both of these "tests" must be 
established by a "clear preponderance of the evidence." Section 357(c).
The court reviewed several cases discussing section 357(b) and set forth the following 
prevailing principles:
(i) business purpose is to be examined "narrow[ly] to a purpose 'with respect to the 
assumption' [of a liability] and to a purpose to avoid income tax 'on the exchange."198 (ii) 
the closer the nature of the liabilities to the customary business of the transferee and its 
continued viability, the more likely that Section 357(b) 's principle ’business purpose’ test 
will be satisfied;199 (iii) if the liabilities were incurred well before the transfer of stock, 
the more likely it is they will be considered as incurred for a business purpose and not tax 
avoidance;200 and (iv) the longer the life span of the corporate vehicle utilized and term of 
any promissory notes issued, the more likely a court will find the transaction to have been 
undertaken for a "business purpose.”201
The court concluded that the taxpayer satisfied these test.  First, the contingent liabilities 
assumed “clearly were related to Anchor's, Garlock's, and Garrison's ordinary business, 
and the management and minimization of such liabilities was essential to the continued 
viability of Anchor and potentially Garlock.”  Second, the court noted that the events that 
gave rise to the contingent liabilities “took place well before the Garrison transaction.”  
In addition, the court observed that “the fact that the Stemco promissory note had a 15 
year term and that Garlock, Stemco, and Garrison continue to function today -- eight 
years after the formation of Garrison also weighs in favor of the Garrison transaction 
being viewed as having a bona fide business purpose.”  Finally, the court evaluated the 
overall result of establishing Garrisson and held that “the separate Garrison structure 
became an important factor in Coltec's ability to sell the company to B.F. Goodrich 
Corporation in 1999.”
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The court concluded that “for these reasons, the court has determined that the record in 
this case establishes that Garrison's assumption of Garlock's contingent asbestos 
liabilities had a "bona fide" business purpose that satisfied Section 357(b) by a clear 
preponderance of the evidence.”
4. Economic Substance Analysis
The court began by stating the principle that the economic substance  doctrine is ‘a 
composite of the ’business purpose’ doctrine, the ,’substance over form’ doctrine, and the 
’sham transaction’ doctrine.”  Thus, the court, in one sentence, collapsed all four 
common law doctrines into one single standard.  The Government provided the court 
with the usual list of "binding precedent" that "supports the principle that economic 
substance, and not mere formal compliance with the Code, must inform the interpretation 
and application of the tax law, " including Gregory v. Helvering and Commissioner v. 
Court Holding Co  The court, however, emphasized that ”[a] careful reading of other 
cases cited by the Government, however, reveals that the Court resolved the tax question 
at issue first by looking to the Code and utilized doctrinal language only to further 
support its conclusion.”  Thus, as set forth in greater detail below, a court will apply 
common law doctrines only where the statute is unclear an open to several 
interpretations. 
Furthermore, the Federal court of Claims reviewed the three cases cited by the 
government from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to conclude 
that all three did not endorse the use of the economic substance doctrine.202
The court, however, stated that even if it was required to apply the economic substance 
test, Coltec has satisfied the test because it satisfied the busijness purpose of section 357 
(b), and, therefore “the ’economic substance’ doctrine is satisfied, since that doctrine 
requires proof of at least one of these tests.”203
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F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2001) ("This economic-substance doctrine . . . provides that a transaction ceases 
to merit tax respect when it has no 'economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits [i.e., tax 
avoidance].'"); Northern Indiana Public Service v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[The 
Finally, the court supported its conclusion that the transaction had economic substance on 
the grounds that “from the ‘standpoint of the prudent investor,’ the Garrison transaction 
not only appeared to place one more barrier in the way of veil piercing claims, but it 
provided the B.F. Goodrich Corporation with a sufficient comfort level to purchase all of 
the Coltec Group in 1999.204
The court cited Joseph Bankman with agreement, stating that "Congress may have no 
choice but to engage in substantive law reform. Some shelter activity will take place 
under even the most utopian tax structure. However, the current tax treatment of capital 
needlessly multiplies shelter opportunities and provides a fertile breeding ground for 
shelter development."205
Thus, the court concluded that “[u]nder our time-tested system of separation of powers, it 
is Congress, not the court, that should determine how the federal tax laws should be used 
to promote economic welfare. .  Accordingly, the court has determined that where a 
taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress, as Coltec did in 
this case, the use of the economic substance doctrine to trump "mere compliance with the 
Code would violate the separation of powers.”
IV. Legislative Proposals to Codify the Economic Substance Doctrine
A. Overview
In recent years, several legislative proposals to “codify” or “clarify” the economic 
substance doctrine have been made.  These proposals, however, have been criticized not 
only by commentators but also by Government officials on various grounds.206  In 
general, all recent proposals state that the economic substance requirement is a 
conjunctive two-prong test and cannot be satisfied by reason of a transaction's having a 
economic substance doctrine] engender[s] the principle that a corporation and the form of its transactions 
are recognizable for tax purposes, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in 
bona fide economically- based business transactions."); Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 
89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) ("To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the 
taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the 
transaction[.]"); Black and Decker Corp v. United States, No. WDQ-02, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 21201 at 6 
(N.D. Md. Oct. 22, 2004) (holding that a "court may not ignore a transaction that has economic substance, 
even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.).  
204
 Citing See Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A] court could either inquire 
whether there were any non-tax economic effects or use the analysis under Section 183. Whether the 
terminology used was that of 'economic substance, sham, or Section 183 profit motivation' was not critical; 
what was important was reliance on objective factors in making the analysis.") (citations omitted).
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 Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5, 29-30 (2000-01)
206
 Samuel C. Thompson Jr. and Robert Allen Clary II, Coming In From The 'Cold': The Case For ESD 
Codification, 2003 TNT 102-33 (May 23, 2003) (citing Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy 
Pamela Olson’s statement in her nomination hearings before the Senate Finance Committee: “I do not think 
that codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine will help.”).    
potential for profit unless both (a) the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax 
profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected 
tax benefits and (b) the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction exceeds a 
risk- free rate of return. As of today, Congress has adopted none of these proposals.  
Recently, the JOBS Act of 2004 was signed by the president in October 22, 2004, leaving 
out the latest version of the proposed codification.
B. History
1. 1999-2000: Treasury’s and Joint Committee on Taxation’s Reports 
on Tax Shelters
In 1999, both Treasury and the joint Committee on Taxation released comprehensive 
reports discussion corporate tax shelters and suggested alternative routes to fight such 
transaction.  Both reports have officially suggested, for the first time, the possibility 
of “codifying” the common law doctrine of economic substance.  In its July 1999 
Report on Tax Shelters, Treasury suggested to codify the economic substance 
doctrine.207 As set forth above, Treasury suggested that “[a] tax avoidance 
transaction would be defined as any transaction in which the reasonably expected pre-
tax profit (determined on a present value basis, after taking into account foreign taxes 
as expenses and transaction costs) of the transaction are insignificant relative to the 
reasonably expected net tax benefits.”  Thus, Treasury suggested to apply a single 
objective standard rather than the two prong test.
A similar proposal was included in the Clinton Administration’s Budget Proposal for 
the Fiscal Year 2001.208
The Joint Committee on Taxation proposed a similar standard in its July 1999 report.
Under the Joint Committee’s proposal tax benefits will be disallowed in “[t]he 
reasonably expected pretax profit from the arrangement is insignificant relative to the 
reasonably expected tax benefits." 209
2. 2001-2002: First Drafts 
During 2001-2002, two legislative proposals were made pursuant to which the 
economic substance doctrine would be codified as part of section 7701.210  Under 
proposed new section 7701(m)(B):
A transaction has economic substance only if--
207
 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax shelters: Discussion Analysis, and 
Legislative Problems (1999)
208
 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, General Explanation of the Administration's Revenue Proposals (Feb. 2000).  
209
 Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of Present Law Penalty and Interest Provisions, as Required by 
Section 3801 of the Internal Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (JCS-3-99), Released on July 
22, 1999, at 229.
210
 House Ways and Means Committee member Lloyd Doggett’s H.R. 2520, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (July 17, 
2001); House Ways and Means Committee Chair William Thomas's H.R. 5095, 107th Cong. 2d Sess., 
"American Competitiveness Act of 2002," (July 11, 2002).
(I) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal 
Income Tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and
(II) the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering into 
such transaction and the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing 
such purpose. 
Thus, the proposal adopted the two-prong conjunctive test. Congress, however, has 
not adopted these proposals during 2001 and 2002.  
3. 2003-2004: Jobs Acts and Various Similar Proposals
During 2003, the attempts to codify or clarify the doctrines continued with the 
introduction of two almost identical proposed provisions in: (i) the Jobs and Growth 
Reconciliation Tax Act of 2003 (Pub. Law No. 108-27), as reported by the Senate 
Finance Committee on May 8, 2003, and passed by the Senate on May 16, 2003;211
and (ii) the Care Act of 2003, passed by the Senate on April 9, 2003.212
Consistent with previous years’ versions, both proposals set forth that a transaction has 
economic substance only if: (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from 
federal tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position; (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial 
non-tax purpose for entering into the transaction; and (iii) the transaction is a reasonable 
means of accomplishing that purpose. 
In addition, consistent with previous proposed codifications, both proposals stated that 
the economic substance requirement cannot be satisfied by reason of a transaction's 
211
 S. 1054, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 16, 2003). See Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), "Summary of 
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(May 22, 2003).
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having a potential for profit unless both (a) the present value of the reasonably expected 
pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the 
expected tax benefits and (b) the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction 
exceeds a risk-free rate of return. In determining pre-tax profit for this purpose, fees and 
foreign taxes are treated as expenses.
On July 25, 2003, House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas introduced the 
“American Jobs Creation Act of 2003 (H.R. 2896), which was the follow-up proposal to 
the American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002 (H.R. 5095).
The "American Jobs Creation Act of 2003," did not include the proposal to codify the 
economic substance doctrine..
Nevertheless, on September 18, 2003, Sens. Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, and Max 
Baucus, D-Mont., the chair and ranking minority member of the Senate Finance 
Committee, introduced the Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act of 2003, S. 
1637. Section 401 of the JOBS Act would codify the economic substance doctrine, 
consistent with the Charity, Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment (CARE) Act. 
4. The JOBS Act of 2004
On May 11, 2004, the JOBS Act passed the Senate by a 92-5 vote.  This later version, 
which was not included in the legislation signed by the president in October 22, 2004, 
was generally consistent with previous proposals, and applies the rigid two-prong test.  
Set forth below is a summary of the recent proposed version. 
i. Scope of the Doctrine
The proposed standard applies only if a court determines that the economic substance 
doctrine is relevant for the disputed transaction.213 If the court determines that the 
doctrine is relevant, the transaction will be validated only if the proposed standard 
discussed below is met.214 Thus, a court may simply decide that there is no need to apply 
the doctrine on a transaction.  For example, as set forth above, in Coltec Industries, the 
Federal Court of Claims cited several cases for the proposition that when the language of 
the Internal Revenue Code is clear, common law doctrines may not be applied. 
Pursuant to proposed IRC 7701(n)(3)(A), the term “economic substance doctrine” means 
“the common law doctrine under which tax benefits with respect to a transaction are not 
213
 Proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(a) would set forth that: “[i]n any case in which a court determines that the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant for purposes of this title to a transaction (or series of transactions), 
such transaction (or series of transactions) shall have economic substance only if the requirements of this 
paragraph are met.”
214 Id.  Thus, a court may choose not to apply the new proposed statutory standard.  Monte A. Jackel, "For 
Better or For Worse: Codification of Economic Substance," summarized in Tax Notes, May 24, 2004, p. 
1069; James M. Peaslee Dover Done In By Senate ETI Bill; Don't Be The Last To Know, 2004 TNT 115-
37.
allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business 
purpose.”  Thus, under the proposal, it is a conjunctive test.   Note that the proposed 
codification only applies to business.  For individuals, the doctrine applies only to 
transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in 
for the production of income.215
The proposed legislation sets forth that other common law doctrines are not affected. 216
Nevertheless, as set forth above, there is a strong relationship between the economic 
substance doctrine and other common law doctrines such as the substance-over-form, 
sham transaction and business purpose doctrines. Thus, it is unclear to what extent these 
doctrines would not be affected.  In addition, it is unclear whether a court can decide not 
to apply the economic substance doctrine but to apply the sham transaction standard, and 
if the court chooses to do so, can the court apply the common law standard as opposed to 
the proposed codification? These questions remain unanswered.  
ii. Rigid Two-Prong Test
Consistent with previous codification proposals, the proposed legislation suggested that a 
transaction will have economic substance only if (i) the transaction changes in a 
meaningful way (apart from Federal tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and 
(ii) the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering into such transaction and 
the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing such purpose.217
There are two main problems with this proposed conjunctive standard. First, as set forth 
above, courts are divided with respect to how to apply the two-prong test, and, certainly, 
several recent cases discussed herein have indicated that it is not so common to apply the 
rigid two-prong conjunctive test.  Second, as discussed herein, the proposed prongs do 
not reflect the prevailing authorities on economic substance.  With respect to the first 
prong, various courts have applied a reasonable expectation for profit test rather than the 
broader test suggested in the proposed legislation. Second, and more significantly, the 
second requirement of the subjective test implies that the subjective prong would require 
not only that the taxpayer has significant nontax purpose, but also that the taxpayer is not 
free to choose how to get there.     
iii. Relying on Potential for Profit
As stated above, many taxpayers attempt to assert that their transaction has economic 
substance by virtue of having potential for profit. Under Proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(ii), 
if a taxpayer attempts to rely on profit potential, “[a] transaction shall not be treated as 
having economic substance by reason of having a potential for profit unless (i) the 
present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial 
215
 Proposed IRC 7701(n)(3)(C). 
216
 Proposed IRC 7701(n)(4). 
217
 See proposed IRC 7701(n)(1)(B)(i)(I) and (II). 
in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if 
the transaction were respected, and (ii) the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction exceeds a risk-free rate of return.” 
The first part of the proposed rule requires that not only the potential profit ought to be 
more than de-minimis, it must significant in relation to the expected net tax benefits from 
the disputed transaction.  As set forth above, this principle has been accepted only by a 
few courts, and is clearly inconsistent with decisions across all circuits and courts. 
Commentators have criticized the comparison with tax benefits approach,218 and the 
risk- free minimum return approach.219  As commentators indicated, rather than 
“codifying” or “clarifying” a common law doctrine, the proposed legislation would 
set forth a new and higher standard, which has not been adopted by the vast majority 
of courts.220  For example, the proposed legislation would change the objective 
standard from “reasonable possibility of profit” to “reasonably-expected pretax 
profit,”221 a change that is inconsistent with the vast majority of cases.222  Various 
commentators have warned that the proposed legislation could apply to common tax 
structuring and otherwise clearly permissible transactions.223  For example, certain 
218
 Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, at n. 33 (stating that: “This passage suggests that 
the court [in Saba] favored an approach that compared tax benefits to pretax profits - an approach 
consistent with the Treasury Department's shelter proposals but inconsistent with most case law on point.”).
219 See NYSBA Objects To Codification Of Economic Substance Provisions, 2003 TNT 102-19 (May 21, 
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220 See Kevin D. Dolan, Notice 98-5 Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, 455 PLI/Tax 1029, 1047-1050 (1999) 
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 James M. Peaslee, Economic Substance Codification Gets Worse, 2003 TNT 97-28 (“The profit test will 
be failed by many transactions that should be found to have economic substance.”)  (May 16, 2003); Terrill 
types of financial transactions such as swaps might be treated as lacking economic 
substance even if clearly entered into for business reasons.  
Note that pursuant to IRC 7701(n)(1)(C), for purposes of the profit potential test, 
“[f]ees and other transaction expenses and foreign taxes shall be taken into account as 
expenses in determining pre-tax profit.” 
iv. Certain Business Purposes (GAAP Benefits) are 
Ignored
Taxpayers have argued that a purpose of having a financial accounting benefit is enough 
to satisfy the business purpose prong of the two-prong test.  Proposed IRC
7701(n)(1)(II)(i) clarifies that for purposes of the subjective business purpose prong “[a] 
purpose of achieving a financial accounting benefit shall not be taken into account in 
determining whether a transaction has a substantial nontax purpose if the origin of such 
financial accounting benefit is a reduction of income tax.”
v. Special Rules for Certain Transaction with Tax-
Indifferent Parties
Financing Transaction: The form of a transaction which is in substance a borrowing of 
money, or the acquisition of financial capital directly or indirectly, from a tax-indifferent 
party, shall not be respected if the present value of the deductions to be claimed with 
respect to the transaction is substantially in excess of the present value of the anticipated 
economic return of the lender. A public offering shall be treated as a borrowing, or an 
acquisition of financial capital, from a tax-indifferent party if it is reasonably expected 
that at least 50 percent of the offering will be placed with tax-indifferent parties.224
A “tax indifferent party” is defined as “any person or entity not subject to tax imposed by 
subtitle A [of the Internal Revenue Code]. A person shall be treated as a tax-indifferent 
party with respect to a transaction if the items taken into account with respect to the 
transaction have no substantial impact on such person’s liability under subtitle A [of the 
Internal Revenue Code].”225
Income Shifting or Basis Adjustments: The form of a transaction with a tax-indifferent 
party shall not be respected if (i) it results in an allocation of income or gain to the tax-
indifferent party in excess of such party’s economic income or gain, or (ii) it results in a 
basis adjustment or shifting of basis on account of overstating the income or gain of the 
tax-indifferent party.226
A. Hyde and Glen Arlen Kohl, The Shelter Problem Is Too Serious Not To Change The Law, 2003 TNT 
130-44  (July 03, 2003).
224
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vi. Understatement Penalty for Non-economic Substance 
Transactions
Section 404 of the JOBS Act of 2004 also suggested to add new IRC 6662B, imposing an 
understatement penalty for “non-economic substance transactions.  This provision was 
also not included in the bill signed by the president in October 22, 2004.  “Noneconomic 
substance transaction” exists if (A) there is a lack of economic substance, or (B) the 
transaction fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.227
Pursuant to proposed IRC 6662B(a), “[i]f a taxpayer has an noneconomic substance 
transaction understatement for any taxable year, there shall be added to the tax an amount 
equal to 40 percent of the amount of such understatement.” The penalty rate is reduced to 
20% for a transaction with respect to which the relevant facts are disclosed in the return 
or a statement attached to the return.228Finally, under section 417 of the JOBS Act of 
2004, revised IRC 163(m) would disallow interest deductions which is attributable to a 
noneconomic substance transaction understatement (as defined in section 6662B(c)).”
V. Conclusion and Proposal
Since Frank Lyon, circuits have been divided on how to apply the two prong test.  As set 
forth above, the inconsistency is reflected in several ways.  First, each circuit has chosen 
a different path pertaining to the test; some circuits apply the conjunctive test, others 
apply a disjunctive test, and the rest apply a unitary analysis.  In addition, there are some 
inconsistencies within some circuits, such as the Second and the Eighth Circuit.  In fact, 
almost every circuit has applied, at least once, the disjunctive test.  Tax Courts are also 
divided and do not follow a uniform standard. 
The last three months have showed that the confusion is about to grow.  The recent court 
cases discussed herein illustrate not only circuits are applying the economic substance 
inconsistently, but also within a certain circuit there could be inconsistent application of 
the two-prong test.  While the court in Long Term Capital Holding v. United States229
seemed convinced that the prevailing standard in the Second Circuit is the unitary 
analysis (rejecting the taxpayer’s attempted reliance on Gilman v. Commissioner), the 
court in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States230 did not dismiss the taxpayer’s assertion that 
the Second Circuit could apply the disjunctive test.231  As set forth above, most circuits 
have discussed, at least once, the possibility of applying the disjunctive test.  The Court 
227
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229 2004 WL 1924931(D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2004).
230
 No. 3:01cv1839 (SRU); No. 3:01cv1840 (SRU).
231
 See above, Gilman v. Commissioner. 
of Claims in Coltec Industries Inc. v. United States232 not only held that the disjunctive 
test is the relevant one, but also decided that a section 357(b) business purpose analysis is 
adequate for purposes of satisfying the two-prong test.  By contrast, in Black & Decker
Corp. v. United States,233 involving an equivalent situation, the parties stipulated that the 
taxpayer had no business purpose as a factual matter, and the court only focused on 
economic substance.  Finally, the court in Black & Decker Corp. v. United 
States234applied the Fourth Circuit’s disjunctive test using a unique combination of Rice’s 
Toyota (the prevailing authority in the Fourth Circuit) and Moline Properties.  
The rejection of the proposed codification of the economic substance doctrine discussed 
herein added to the confusion regarding the appropriate application of the two-prong test.  
As set forth above, the proposed legislation suggested a standard which would be not 
only inconsistent, but also more rigid, than the prevailing standards among all circuits.  
Thus, the rejection, for now, of the proposed codification is justified, because rather than 
“codify” or “clarify” the doctrine, the proposed legislation would have created a new 
higher standard, clearly inconsistent with most authorities discussed herein.
In the absence of codification, it is up to the courts and the IRS to search for uniformity.  
Having reviewed numerous cases involving economic substance analysis across all 
circuits and courts, I believe that a possible solution, which would be acceptable by all 
circuits, could be to transform the two-prong test into a single, flexible objective 
standard.  Such a standard would, in fact, revive the original substance-over-form 
analysis conducted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, and would not 
seem to contradict the current standard applied by all circuits. 
Specifically, I suggest that the standard would simply be whether the transaction had any 
economic effect on the taxpayer, apart from tax benefits.  In particular, if potential profit 
from the transaction is measurable, the test should be whether the reasonably expected 
profit from the transaction exceeded the expected costs.  This, is, as the reader would 
immediately observe, the prevailing standard for the objective prong of the two prong 
test, and the question is what do we do with the subjective prong, and how do we 
reconcile it with the view in the Fourth Circuit, for example?.  The answer is that in the 
vast majority of cases, even the ones applying the two prong test, the subjective intent has 
been incorporated into the objective analysis, either by examining the subjective intent on 
an objective basis, or simply by inferring business purpose in case where the court found 
objective economic substance.  Put broadly, it is much more likely that a court would first 
find economic substance and than infer business purpose than the converse situation 
where the court would infer economic substance from a subjective analysis of the 
taxpayer’s intent.  In addition, it is very unlikely that a court, even in the Fourth Circuit, 
would validate a transaction on the grounds that it had business purpose but not economic 
substance. (see Hines, for example) but much more likely that a court applying the 
disjunctive test would first find objective economic substance and validate the transaction 
with no need to examine business purpose.  For those who still view the subjective prong 
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as essential, the subjective test could remain relevant, but only as one factor among others 
in the overall determination of economic substance.  
Adoption of such a standard, therefore, would not seem to be inconsistent with the 
prevailing disjunctive test, because courts would simply collapse the twp prongs into a 
single test, that reflects the standard such courts have been applying.
Courts applying the conjunctive test would also find this test not inconsistent with their 
standard, because as of today, such courts must conduct an objective analysis regardless 
of the subjective test, and, again, it is very likely that a court finding economic substance 
would validate a transaction by inferring business purpose.  
Finally, courts applying the unitary analysis would find it easy to adjust to such a 
standard, because, in essence, the flexible nature of the unitary analysis allows them to 
focus on one prong, and, most courts have focused anyway on the objective prong.
In addition, the subjective prong is generally mute in cases involving business entities, 
because, in general, business entities are created and operate to make a profit.  Thus, it is 
implicit that a business entity will have a business purpose for any transaction the 
expected benefits of which exceed the expected costs.235  With respect to individuals, 
various statutory rules, including sections 108, 165 and 183, contain subjective business 
purpose requirements (usually in the form of a “primarily-for-profit requirement) for 
purposes of validating a deduction, and such rules ought to govern in the applicable 
cases.  
In addition, I suggest that the comparison between tax benefits and nontax benefits would 
not be followed, not only because it is inconsistent with the vast majority of cases across 
all circuits, but also because it is unfair to taxpayer entering into transaction with 
expectations for a more than de-minimis profit and potential risk of loss.  From Gregory 
v. Helvering to Compaq, courts have clearly stated that a taxpayer may have significant 
tax motivation, as long is at has some nontax purpose, and as long as the latter is 
meaningful, neither the court nor the IRS can establish a higher standard. 
For the same reasons, a requirement that the taxpayer earns at least a risk–free return 
should not be adopted.  In other words, there are no legal grounds for the proposition that 
the taxpayer must make at least a certain return on a transaction in order to be eligible for 
the tax benefits associated with the transaction.  
235
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